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The Antarctic continent holds a vast economic potential in both
renewable and non-renewable resources. Therefore, the sovereignty
of the continent, and in particular the Antarctic peninsula and
Weddell Sea areas, has been a key issue between the two Southern
Cone nations of Argentina and Chile for hundreds of years. Currently
these two nations, along with Great Britain, have overlapping claims
in the region. This thesis examines the geopolitical and historical
claims of these and other nations, along with the current and
potential mechanisms that are designed to regulate the region. It
will also evaluate the potential for conflict in the future over the
disputed region and examines current U.S. interests. It concludes
that the United States should make every effort to maintain the
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The Antarctic continent is unique not only because of its vast
starkness and relative isolation, but also because of its special
multinational governing regime and its potential economic
significance. It is the only continent upon which no nation is
sovereign. There are seven nations which have territorial claims to
sectors of the continent and three of these overlap. Each nation has
its own justification for occupation of the continent, however, these
reasons can be categorized into two main groupings: fulfillment of
geopolitical goals, or economic aspirations.
Since the early 19th century, for example, the insular regions of
the South American continent have been an area of strong contention
between Argentina and Chile. On more than one occasion Argentina
and Chile nearly became involved in armed conflict over the
disputed Beagle Channel. Numerous attempts at a diplomatic
solution to the problem were tried, but all failed. It was not until
1984 that the two countries finally resolved their contention over
the Channel through ratification of the Peace and Friendship Treaty,
arbitrated by the Holy See. In 1982, unable to resolve their
differences diplomatically, Argentina chose to engage Great Britain
in a war over control of the Falkland Islands group, which resulted in
a humiliating defeat for the Argentine forces and proved to be the
undoing of the Galtieri regime. The annexation of the Malvinas had
always been a geopolitical goal of Argentina. But, with its failed
attempt to acquire the island group and its resultant tenuous
relationship with Great Britain, Argentina had no foreseeable
opportunity to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means.
The Falklands/Malvinas Island group was not the only area of the
South Atlantic where contention existed. In the early part of the
twentieth century, Argentina, Chile and Great Britain all laid claim to
essentially the same sector of Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty of
1959, which initially involved twelve nations, did not resolve the
sovereignty issue between Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain but
rather placed the issue on hold until some future date. Meanwhile,
all three nations, plus the other four countries with sovereignty
claims in the region, have taken advantage of the lull by attempting
to further legitimize their claims through the establishment of
permanent bases on the continent.
Currently the potential for conflict in the area is low, but the
potential will exist as long as the three nations with overlapping
claims continue to position themselves for an eventual play for
outright sovereignty of the disputed sector of the Antarctic continent.
This thesis will discuss the historical background that has led to
tensions in the region and will focus on the geopolitical and economic
aspects of the issue as the two main reasons for a possible future
confrontation between some combination of Argentina, Chile and
Great Britain in the South Atlantic region.
II. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As with any geographic region of the world, the Antarctic has an
historical dimension that is relevant and important to the acquisition
of a working knowledge of the problems and issues of the area.
These issues have gained in importance and intensity since the
Antarctic's tentative discovery during Captain Cook's voyage of
1772-1775. Prior to this voyage there had been some speculation of
another, yet undiscovered, continent existing in the Southern
Hemisphere. The Greeks were actually the first to speculate on this
mythical continent which was later dubbed Terra Australis or
southern lands. They believed that in order for the earth to be
properly balanced there must be a land mass to the south to counter
the weight of the Arctic, hence the Antarctic. In 1772, Alexander
Dalrymple also speculated about the possibility of a vast southern
continent larger than Asia with a population of 50 million. 1
Cook's voyage had not actually proven the existence of a southern
continent, indeed it would be another fifty years before that would
happen and even then there would be controversy. However,
Captain Cook's voyage was not completely without accomplishment.
*Peter J. Beck, The International Politics of Anarctica (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1986), 24.
because while circumnavigating the continent he proved that no such
land mass existed north of 60-70 degrees south latitude. 2 Cook was
so awed by his experience in these "unknown and icy seas" that he
said "that no man will ever venture farther than I have done; and
that the lands which may lie to the south will never be explored." 3
Obviously, Cook was wrong, but at the time the idea of proceeding
any further south was absolutely unfathomable given the technical
expertise of the era. Further exploration of the region was delayed
because of the ensuing political unrest in Europe during the next
forty-five years. The French Revolution and the subsequent
Napoleonic Wars proved to completely absorb the once abundant
funds that had previously supported geographic exploration.
In 1821 a Russian serving under Alexander I, Gottlieb von
Bellingshausen, claimed to have found land south of the Antarctic
Circle. One year prior to Bellingshausen's claim, Edward Bransfield,
representing Great Britain, and the following year Nathaniel Palmer,
from the United States, made similar claims.4 As early as 1821 three
nations had already begun to assert themselves in the Antarctic and
by 1839 the Frenchman, Dumont D' Urville, had also joined in the
exploration of the region. Although there were numerous
2F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press, 1982), 2.
3 Beck, 24.
4Luis H. Mericq, Antarctica: Chile's Claim (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, 1987), 7.
expeditions to the Antarctic region during this period, there was no
overwhelming interest in the quest for geographical, cartographical
or general scientific knowledge, consequently, the area was still a
blank spot on most charts of the era. This lackadaisical attitude
prompted Commander Matthew Maury, superintendent of the U. S.
Naval Observatory and Hydrographical Office, to attempt to organize
a nine-nation cooperative effort in the exploration and compilation of
scientific data in the Antarctic region in 1861. 5 At the time, there
was little interest in the proposition, nonetheless he is credited with
the distinction of the "father of international cooperation in the
Antarctic." Although no international explorative effort was
established at the time, individual exploration continued.
In 1897 the Belgiums sent Adrien de Gerlache to conduct a
scientific expedition in the region and the following year a British
expedition, commanded by C. E. Borgchgrevink, a Norwegian, was the
first to establish a shore base on the southern land mass and to
subsequently winter over. 6 While actual exploration of Antarctica
continued slowly, writers such as Spotswood and Mclver stimulated
the imagination of the populace. The writers carefully combined
their vivid imaginations with what little information that had
already been gleaned from the region and were quickly developing
^Kenneth J. Bertrand, Americans in Antarctica 1775-1948 (New York:
American Geographical Society, 1971), 198-206.
^Auburn, 2.
fictional accounts of Antarctic adventures based on the ancient myth
of a land of temperate climes with populations of 30 million. 7
Exploration continued on into the twentieth century and was
further stimulated by an 1895 International Geographical Congress
proclamation that: "the Antarctic was in urgent need of research and
exploration." 8 The proclamation had the desired affect, as the period
saw five more previously uninvolved nations become involved;
England (Scotland), Norway, Sweden, Australia and Japan. However,
the major emphasis was not necessarily to gather scientific data but
rather to be the first to reach the South Pole. This news was doubly
beneficial because it held the imagination of the populace and
stimulated governmental funding for the expeditions. Public interest
peaked when the race for the South Pole came down to just two
explorers. In 1911 Captain Robert Scott, of the Royal Navy, and
Roald Amundsen, of Norway, began their individual quests to be the
first to achieve the distinction. Amundsen was a meticulous planner
who employed time proven techniques learned from the Eskimos of
Greenland in his journey to 90 degrees south latitude. Fair weather,
combined with his use of dogs to pull the sleds, careful nutritional
planning and skillfulness on skis gave him the advantage as his party
reached the Pole on 14 December 1911. Scott, however, did not meet
with the same good fortune. He was plagued with foul weather
7 Beck, 25.
8 Ibid.
delays, indecisiveness and chose to use a variety of transportation
means including tractors, ponies, dogs and finally human power
when the animals had all died. 9 He eventually reached the Pole 33
days after Amundsen, but to no avail because he and his expedition
perished on the return trip. Although the death of Robert Scott and
his fellow explorers was a tragedy, it did serve to draw even more
attention to the region. 10
After the South Pole was reached in 1911, exploration of the
interior began in earnest and continued with most notable
enthusiasm, especially by the United States. Rear Admiral Richard E.
Byrd, USN, headed several privately financed expeditions to the
Antarctic (1928-1930 and 1933-1935). His most significant
contribution was that of establishing the fact that Antarctica was
indeed one Continent, 11 albeit covered by a layer of ice that ranges
up to 4000 meters (13,120 feet) in thickness. 12 By way of
comparison, Mount Whitney in the eastern Sierra Nevada range of
California stands 14,495 feet. Such was the U.S. interest that in 1939
the Congress authorized the establishment of the United States
Antarctic Service (USAS) and assigned Admiral Byrd as its
9jack Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1988), 12.
10Edward K. Mann, National Security Policy for the Antarctic (Maxwell AFB,
Alabama: Air university, 1974), 13-14.
n Beck, 27.
12 Mericq, 15.
commander, whose purpose was to establish permanent bases in the
region. President Franklin Roosevelt expressed the national policy
when he told Admiral Byrd that:
The most important thing is to prove (a) that human beings can
permanently occupy a portion of the continent, winter and
summer; (b) that it is well worth a small annual appropriation to
maintain such permanent bases because of their growing value
for four purposes- national defense of the Western Hemisphere,
radio, meteorology and minerals. Each of these four is of
approximately equal importance as far as we now know. 13
Two bases were established in 1940 but were subsequently
abandoned the following year because of WWII. It is clear from the
actions of the Congress in the establishment of the USAS and
President Roosevelt's message to Admiral Byrd that the United States
saw the value of the region and was willing to invest the resources
necessary in order to reap the benefits of the Antarctic. However,
following the war, the United States did not reactivate the USAS but
did continue with the spirit of the initiative by sending a large naval
expeditionary force to the region in 1946. It was designated
Operation Highjump and was comprised of 13 ships, which included
an aircraft carrier, a submarine and nearly 5,000 men. 14 This was
followed by Operation Windmill the next year but on a much reduced
scale. This post war interest in the region, and especially the
operations themselves, represented more than the traditional quest
13 Beck, 27.
14 Child, Antarctica, 1988, 14.
for scientific knowledge, indeed another dimension of the President's
reasons for establishing a presence in Antarctica had been realized
with the advent of the Cold War.
Because of increased interest in the Antarctic by extraregional
countries, the Argentines and Chileans felt compelled to establish
bases on the Antarctic Peninsula, however, the Argentine base was in
close proximity to the British colony. Given the long established
Anglo-Argentine rivalry, it was not unreasonable to expect that a
conflict involving the two nations would eventually follow. The only
hostile act between nations that has ever taken place in Antarctica
occurred shortly after the British base had been destroyed by a fire
in 1948. The Hope Bay incident occurred in February 1952 when the
British attempted to rebuild their station. As the British ship began
to off-load the construction materials and provisions, the Argentines
gave verbal warning for them to stop. When this did not produce the
desired results, the Argentines fired a machine gun burst over the
heads of the landing party. Consequently, the British withdrew and
proceeded to the Falklands where the British authorities were
informed. Sir Miles Clifford, the governor, immediately dispatched
himself and a contingent of Royal Marines to Hope Bay, whose
presence persuaded the Argentines to retreat, allowing for the
ultimate reconstruction of the base. 15
15 V. Fuchs, Of Ice and Men; The Story of the British Antarctic Survey
(Oswestry: Anthony Nelson, 1982), 164-166.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR
Because of the growing international realization of the importance
and potential of Antarctica, and given the many territorial claims
that had been made and conflicts that had already taken place,
something was needed to defuse the potentially volatile situation.
The scientific community provided the solution with the concept of
the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which actually lasted from
1 July 1957 to 21 December 1958. During this period of
international cooperation over 5,000 scientists from 56 countries
worked on Antarctic related projects. 16 Scientists from 12 nations:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United
States, all conducted extensive research from 55 different base
stations on the southern continent. 17
The IGY was actually conceptualized in the early 1950's by an
American scientist Dr. Lloyd Berkner of the Carnegie Institute. His
original idea was to organize a third polar year as a dedicated and
purely scientific effort. However, the idea eventually evolved into
the IGY concept. 18 A major hindrance to the scientific study of
16 Jeffery F. White, "The Southern Cone and Antarctica: Strategies for the
1990's" (Master's Thesis, University of Florida, 1986), 14.
17 Mann, 15.
18 Albert Crary, "International Geophysical Year: Its Evolution and U.S.
Participation," Antarctic Journal , vol.XVII, no.4, (1982), 1-4. The first and
second polar years took place in 1882-3 and 1932-3 respectively and were
primarily concerned with the gathering of scientific data from both the North
and South Poles.
10
Antarctica prior to the inception of the IGY was the issue of
sovereignty. Therefore the most important element of the IGY was
its emphasis on cooperative efforts between countries. This concept
of international cooperation was a watershed for Antarctic politics
and the quest for scientific data of the region. At the July 1955 Paris
Conference, the so called "Gentleman's Agreement" was tauted as an
"exclusively scientific and politically innocuous event which
advanced the cause of knowledge in which it was agreed not to
engage in legal or political argumentation during that period in order
that scientific progress might proceed without argumentation." 19
Although the IGY was praised as being non-political in nature and
purely scientific, political overtones did manage to taint the program.
One of the major political aspects of the IGY, for example, was the
locating of bases within "their" respective claimed sectors. 20 In other
words, nations were taking advantage of the situation by building
bases which were hoped would later help legitimize their claims to
the Antarctic. Overall however, the International Geophysical Year
was a tremendous success. It greatly increased public awareness of
the Antarctic and some of its related political issues and more
importantly greatly increased the overall scientific data base.
Additionally, it spawned a proving ground for new cold weather




neutral environment where international cooperation could exist and
be relatively free from political influences. But the single most
important contribution of the International Geophysical Year was
that it provided the foundation for the Antarctic Treaty. 21
C. THE TREATY
Since the Antarctic Treaty had its roots in the International
Geophysical Year, the two concepts are very similar. The Antarctic
Treaty, for example, continues the spirit of international cooperation
for the compilation of scientific data from joint research, but the
Treaty goes well beyond the scope of the IGY.
The International Geophysical Year would probably have been
extended indefinitely except that most of the participating nations
perceived a military threat to the region. The Soviets had managed
to construct five stations in the southern sector of Wilkes Land, thus
giving them a more substantial claim to a sector of Antarctica if and
when the opportunity ever presented itself and a military advantage
not previously held. The substantial Soviet presence in the region
must therefore be considered as a prime motivating factor in the
decision to conduct the Washington Conference of October 1959. 22
The real issue for the United States and other western nations was
21 Mann, 15-16.
22 H. Larzilliere, "Territorial Claims in the Polar Regions," La Revue Maritime .
no. 196, February, 1963, 216-227. Translated from French to English by the
Department of the Navy
,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of
Naval Intelligence Translation Section by LCDR Hendler, 5.
12
not so much the possible territorial claims to be gleaned by the USSR
but rather the ominous strategic implications of Soviet bases in the
Antarctic. Larzilliere points out that:
Military interest was evident, since during the last war German
submarines and raiders based in these waters had damaged
Allied convoys running the Atlantic and South Pacific. Australia
felt threatened by future Soviet missile launching sites.23
Consequently, the prime motivating factor which led to such
cooperation was the threat of the Cold War spreading to Antarctica.24
Additionally, there was a growing number of interested nations
intrigued with the possibilities that were evoked by the Antarctic,
which further illustrated the need for some sort of long term
document that would address all the issues of concern.
Consequently, on 3 May 1958, the United States took the
initiative and proposed a conference to discuss how best to deal with
the current issues.25 The other nations involved in the IGY accepted
the idea of the special conference and the following year meetings
began. By 1 December 1959 the treaty had been completely worked
out and ratified by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States, the same twelve nations
23 Ibid.
24 Carlos J. Moneta, "Antarctica, Latin America and the International System in
the 1980's Toward a New Order," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs , vol.23, no.l, (February 1981): 29.
25 Mann, 17.
1 3
which had been a part of the International Geophysical Year. 26 Since
that time Poland (1977), Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany,
1981 and the German Democratic Republic, 1987), Brazil (1983),
India (1983), the People's Republic of China (1985), Uruguay (1985),
Italy (1987), Spain (1988), Sweden (1988), Finland (1989), the
Republic of Korea (1989), and Peru (1989) have also become
Contracting Parties. 27 In order to hold a Contracting Party (or
Consultative) position, and therefore be entitled to vote, a nation
must be actively engaged in significant scientific research. There are
also eighteen non-Contracting Parties (or acceding nations): Austria,
Bulgaria, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador,
Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Romania, and the
People's Democratic Republic of Korea. 28 These nations are not
eligible to vote on Antarctic issues.
The Antarctic Treaty, which was signed on 1 December 1959
and ratified on 23 June 1961, is a document composed of fourteen
articles addressing the issues of concern and supplying guidance for
26Myhre, 12-17.
27 Child, Antarctica, 1988, 19. FBIS Lat 89-024, Lima Television Peruana in
Spanish, 3 February 1989, reported that the Peruvian Government has begun
construction of a meteorological station at the same site where the Machu
Picchu Station will be installed. According to FBIS Lat. 89-195, 11 October 1989,
Lima Television Peruana in Spanish, 9 October 1989, Peru became a full
Consultative member to the Antarctic Treaty. At a meeting in Paris on 9
October, Foreign Minister Guillermo Larco Cox announced that Peru would now
"have a right to participate in the decisions regarding the South Pole."
28
"No Consensus on Antarctica," United Nations Chronicle . March 1988, vol. 25,
no.l, 77.
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all participants in the affairs of the Antarctic (see Appendix A for the
treaty in its entirety). The more important points of the treaty are
as follows:
Article I. Any military activities such as the establishment of
bases and fortifications, conducting any military maneuvers and the
testing of any type of weapons is prohibited. However, it does allow
for the use of military personnel to conduct scientific research.
Article II. Antarctica is designated an area in which there shall
be no restriction on scientific investigation.
Article III. Calls for the free exchange of all scientific data,
future experimentation projects and scientific personnel.
Article IV. By subscribing to the treaty the signatories are not
forfeiting their right to any claims of sovereignty. But by the same
token no new claims or expansion of existing claims can be made as
long as the treaty is in force.
Article V. All nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste
are specifically prohibited.
Article VI. The applicability of the treaty extends to 60
degrees south latitude and in no way is to interfere with any nation's
rights with concern to passage of the region on the high seas in
accordance with international law.
Article VII. Aerial observation and on site inspection of all
participant's facilities, which includes all dwellings, aircraft and
ships, is authorized in order to verify compliance with the treaty.
1 5
Article VIII. Basic law article which states that all personnel
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they
are nationals. With regards to any other person whose country is not
a Contracting Party, the member nations are directed to consult with
one another in order to resolve the issue.
Article IX. Representatives of the signatory nations are
directed to meet at suitable intervals in order to exchange
information and to better facilitate scientific research, international
scientific cooperation, exercise of rights of inspection as per Article
VII.
Article XI. If a dispute arises between two or more Contracting
Parties they are obligated to resolve their differences by negotiation,
mediation, arbitration, or other peaceful means. If these methods
fail to resolve the conflict then the matter shall, with the consent of
all parties, be referred to the International Court of Justice.
Article XII. The treaty may be amended at any time with the
consent of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are eligible
to participate in accordance with Article IX. A nation has two years
in which to ratify the new amendment. If no action is taken within
that period then that nation is considered to have withdrawn from
the treaty. The entire treaty is eligible for review after thirty years
at the request of any Contracting Party still eligible under the
provisions of Article IX. 29
29
It is important to note that review of the Antarctic Treaty is in no way
mandatory under the provisions of the treaty itself. As of this date no
16
Article XIII. In addition to the twelve signatory nations the
treaty shall be open for any member nation of the United Nations for
accession or by any other nation so invited and approved by the
Contracting Parties. The United States is designated as the
depository government. 30
As can be seen from the foregoing summary, the Antarctic Treaty
covers a fairly wide range of issues while effectively pigeonholing
the question of individual sovereignty claims. Although this was one
of the treaty's goals, it more effectively accomplishes two others; the
establishment of scientific cooperation, and the institution of a
continent devoid of military activity including related items such as
conventional and nuclear weapons testing. 31 It would seem that at
the time of the Washington Conference in October 1959, attempting
to resolve the sovereignty issue would have effectively diminished
all chances of accomplishing the scientific and demilitarization goals
of the treaty. Therefore, it was more expeditious to postpone any
negotiations relative to sovereignty. The treaty was valid for at least
30 years from the time of its ratification and would allow contending
nations to delay these sovereignty issues at least until 1991.
signatory nation has called for a review. Thirty years will expire on 23 June
1991.
30 Derived from the Antarctic Treaty as reproduced in Myhre.
31 Larzilliere, 7.
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III. THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF ANTARCTICA
The vast Antarctic continent and littoral regions have both
tremendous potential and proven renewable and non-renewable
resources. The littoral regions of the Antarctic were first exploited
when whaling and sealing ships began to harvest the abundant sea
life in the late 1700's. This continued into the mid-twentieth
century. For example, during the 1933-1934 season 80.1 percent of
all whales harvested and 92.6 percent of whale oil production in the
world came from the Antarctic region. The 1938-1939 season
yielded even more with 84.1 percent and 94.2 percent
respectively. 32
Mineral and hydrocarbon deposits on the other hand have not
been found in large quantities, speculation mostly exists as to the
possible estimates. The continental drift theory is the major
supporter of the idea of large, minable deposits of ore and petroleum.
According to the theory, an extremely large land mass,
Gondwanaland, existed 150,000,000 years ago which eventually
broke up into present day South America, Africa, India, Antarctica,
Australia and New Zealand. 33 The substantiation for the theory is
based on similar geological and paleontological features found on all
six continents.
32Beck, 26-27.
33 Henry C. Lane, LCDR. USN., Current Issues Concerning the Antarctic Treaty
System (Newport: Naval War College, 1984), 11.
18
Recently researchers at the University of California at Davis and
the University of Texas have introduced an amplifying hypothesis to
the Gondwanaland theory. These researchers speculate that
somewhere between 500 and 700 million years ago the Antarctic
continent was part of North America before it began to drift south
and become part of Gondwanaland. They base their theory on
matching rock formations now found in Nevada, Idaho and into the
Canadian Rockies and along the Transantarctic Mountains of the
southern continent. 34
A. RENEWABLE RESOURCES
The icy waters surrounding Antarctica have an abundance of
economically viable marine life such as krill, seals, finfish, squid and
migrating whales, while the land/ice mass' organic resources have no
commercial value. The only major life forms on the continent itself
are four species of penguins and the various types of flying birds, of
which there are nearly fifty species. 35
Krill is a small shrimp-like organism that is used as a food
supplement in many countries and is the principal food source for
whales and some species of seals. Because it consists of fifteen
percent protein, krill has the potential to become a staple in the
human diet as well and also could be used as animal fodder or
34Deborah Blum, "Geologists see California ties to Antarctica," San Jose
Mercury . 27 March 1991, Dl.
35 Mercq, 26.
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fertilizer. The nations most actively involved in the harvesting of
krill are the USSR, Bulgaria, Poland and Japan, with Chile, Germany,
South Korea and Taiwan which are experimenting with additional
methods for its use. Currently, krill is sold in bulk, raw form and can
be fried, used in pate or in various other forms. 36
Krill are found in the ocean traveling in extremely large schools
covering several square miles. These large quantities are generally
found drifting with the current within the first 55 fathoms of water,
with the greatest concentration being within the top five fathoms.
Since this is essentially the same depth of water that commercial
grades of warm water shrimp are harvested, there was no need to
develop any new form of technology for the taking of krill. 37 By
some 1976 estimates, it can be scooped up at a rate of 50 tons per
knot. 38 It is estimated that 100 million tons of krill can be extracted
annually without having any impact on the Antarctic ecosystem. The
major reason for such an abundance of the small crustaceans is
attributed to the Antarctic Convergence Zone. This is the boundary
between the Antarctic Ocean and the convergence of the Pacific,
Atlantic and Indian Oceans. It forms an irregular boundary around
the continent and is evidenced by a five degree temperature
differential and an increase in salinity. This convergence, caused by
36 Ibid, 23.
37 Francisco Orrego Vincuna, ed., Antarctic Resources Policy; Scientific. Leg al,
and Political Issues . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 30.
38 Meriq, 23.
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the temperature differential, causes the warmer northern waters to
rise above the colder Antarctic water dredging up rich nutrients
from the ocean bottom as it rises. The krill and phytoplankton then
congregate in large quantities around these areas. 39
Beginning in the late 1700's fur seals were harvested in such
large quantities that they nearly became extinct. Consequently,
commercial sealing was halted at the beginning of this century and is
now regulated by the Convention for Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).40 According to this agreement,
limited numbers of crabeater, leopard, and Weddell seals can be
harvested while no Ross, elephant or southern fur seals can be
taken. 41 Since the hunting restrictions were applied, the populations
have increased significantly and all species of seals could potentially
be harvested again.
Finfish and squid are also commercially harvested predominantly
in the northern Antarctic insular regions because the Antarctic
Treaty prohibits fishing south of 60 degree south latitude.42 Of the
39Lane, 13.
40 Ibid, 15.
4 Jonathan I. Charney, ed., The New Nationalism and the Use of Common
S paces (Totowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982), 122.
42According to FBIS Lat 88-041 Santiago La Tercera De La Hora in Spanish, 25
February 88, p8, Soviet fishing trawlers have been frequently violating the
treaty by fishing beyond the limit set by the treaty, to which the Soviet Union
was one of the original twelve nations to subscribe to the document. This is
not an uncommon behavior for the Soviets.
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fish that are found in this region most are large headed and
demersal, whose habitat is the deep ocean. The species most
available for human consumption are cod and herring, however the
potential gain from the harvest is substantially offset by distance,
climatic conditions and the lack of dense shoals.43 Most of the
commercial fishing that take does place is in the vicinity of South
Georgia and the Kerguelen Islands . 44 These two areas were heavily
fished in the period 1969-1974, during which time the annual catch
dropped from 432,000 tons to 13,500 tons. This drop was thought to
be indicative of a fish population that had a slow growth rate and
significant longevity and showed that stocks had been reduced below
the substantial yield figure.45 Consequently, there is little known of
the fish and squid population in the Antarctic littoral regions.
As previously mentioned, the whaling industry contributed
significantly to the world supply of whale products, supplying nearly
95 percent of the demand for blubber. This tremendous economic
resource was the original catalyst for political and scientific interest
in the region and as Beck points out: "proved a major factor in
serving not only to undermine the continent's isolation from the





research on whales and related aspects." 46 Since the early days the
demand for whale products has dropped significantly, but so have
the numbers of whales. Some studies show as much as a 16 percent
drop in the biomass level, which is most likely a combination of
continued hunting by the Soviet Union and Japan, despite an
international moratorium since 1986, and the large krill harvests.47
Even though these two nations continue to conduct whaling activities,
it is not currently considered nor likely to be a significant economic
activity in the Antarctic region.
In November 1990, ignoring international appeals, the Japanese
began their fourth season of what they term "research expeditions"
to Antarctic waters. They plan to harvest 300 minke whales during
the four month expedition. Many environmental groups have
claimed the trip is simply a cover for continued commercial
whaling.48
Not often considered as a resource, are icebergs. The Antarctic
ice mass contains nearly 90 percent of the earth's fresh water. It is
estimated that 1200 cubic kilometers of ice break away from the ice
shelf each year. If only ten percent of the water could be used there
would be enough to service a geographical area with a population of
46 Beck, 217.
47 Ibid, 217. Since krill is the primary source of food for the whales, its
harvest, and thus its availability, also affects the whale population.
48
"Whaling Ships Leave for Antarctica," San Jose Mercury . 25 November 1990,
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500 million.49 Despite the obvious benefits of enormous quantities of
fresh water for drought-stricken areas of the world, there are some
obvious major obstacles which must be overcome in order to realize
these benefits. The actual transportation of the iceberg is not
necessarily a major problem, depending upon the draft of the berg,
which can be as much as 650 feet. Herein, however, lies the major
difficulty because the below water depth of the iceberg will dictate
how close it can be towed to shore. By comparison the typical
continental shelf has a depth of 650 feet at its outer edge. Therefore,
depending upon the draft of the iceberg the water may have to be
pumped a considerable distance. 50 At the present time, this sort of
idea is not very practical, however, with certain technological
advances it could become very feasible.
B. NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES
There has been much speculation as to the exact amounts of
minerals and hydrocarbons existing on the Antarctic continent.
Besides the large coal deposits found along the Transantarctic
Mountains and iron ore deposits in the eastern portion of the
continent, there has yet to be definitive proof of significant mineral
deposits. There is evidence, however, that indicates a high
probability of ore grade mineral deposits along the Antarctic
49 J.F. Lovering and J.R.V. Prescott, Last of Lands. ..Antarctica (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1975), 56.
50White, 37.
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Peninsula. The geological structure of the exposed rock formations of
this curvilinear mountain chain are strikingly similar to the basic
structure of the Andes, which tends to lend credibility to the
speculation of similar ore deposits. 51 The Andes have large deposits
of porphyry type mineralization such as copper and molybdenum.
There is no question that the two mountain ranges are very similar
but there are also some important differences. The major
dissimilarity is that the pophyry type mineral deposits are of low
quality and spread through large amounts of rock.52
Assuming that the theories and predictions of a Gondwanaland
are correct, it will nonetheless be extremely difficult to locate these
deposits given that only two percent of the land mass is exposed.53
Despite this fact, scientists have conducted sufficient studies about
the "geological and tectonic structure" of the continent to justify some
general facts. Zumberge notes that:





while such "broad brush" approaches to the question of
resources will not yield specific information as to where
exploration should be concentrated, a general understanding of
the overall geologic relationships is the first step in narrowing
the areas of future interest. It must be kept in mind also that
each new field of geologic activity in Antarctica adds new
increments of information to the overall geologic understanding
of the continent and surrounding sea bed. 54
Mining in polar regions is not a new concept as it has been done
quite successfully in the Arctic areas (above 60 degrees north) of
Canada, Greenland, Alaska, Norway and the Soviet Union. There are
over 35 operating mines, with eleven operating above 70 degrees
north, that extract copper, nickel, cobalt, gold, lead, zinc, iron, tin,
diamonds and coal. 55 Two mines in Canada, the Polaris and Black
Angel mines, served as the models for a feasibility study of
proposed mines in the Antarctic. These two mines, having most of
the exact same characteristics as would be encountered in the
Antarctic, proved to be productive and profitable despite the low
commodity prices at the time of the evaluation.56
In 1972, extensive surface drilling was conducted in order to
confirm the presence of suspected lead-zinc ore deposits, at what
would later become the Polaris Mine. In 1973, after the deposit was
54 Charney, 124.
55 De Wit, 8. The majority of these mines are in the Soviet Union which makes
it difficult to evaluate their relative efficiency as compared to other mines in
Canada.
56 Ibid, 8-13. These mining operations would be similar in scope to the
Antarctic conditions in that this region is also covered by a permanent ice cap,
albeit only 3 km thick.
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confirmed, a five year feasibility study began. In 1981, the study
concluded that capital costs would run $112.5 million with working
capital costing $32.4 million and reaching $35.3 million by 1985. 57 If
these costs are projected to 1991, using a nominal five percent
inflation adjustment, estimated capital costs would be $168.8 million
with working capital running $45.9 million needed to construct and
begin a mining operation in the Antarctic.
The Polaris Mine is located at 77 degrees north latitude which is
the northern-most hard-rock mine in the world. 58 This is an
important fact because it lends credibility to the applicability of the
study as it would apply to the installation of a similar mine in the
Antarctic. The climatic conditions of both regions are also similar,
having dry, cold conditions with winter time temperatures varying
from -50 to -10 degrees centigrade. Both regions have thick layers
of ice covering the land mass as well, with the Antarctic having the
thickest. 59 Therefore, these studies would suggest that the
possibilities for the successful establishment of a mine in the
Antarctic would seem to be greatly increased.
In recent years the continental shelves of Argentina and Brazil
have been explored for hydrocarbon deposits, which have yielded





therefore, was also a prime candidate for exploration. After
exploring Antarctica's excessively deep and narrow continental shelf,
it was determined that the Ross Sea was the best area in which to
drill for hydrocarbon deposits. After extensive marine geophysical
studies had been conducted, the Glomar Challenger drilled four holes
and discovered methane, ethane, and ethylene in three of the four
holes. 60 Data drawn from the Glomar Challenger finding indicated
that 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
were present in the Ross Sea Basin.61
Other areas of potential hydrocarbon deposits are the Weddell
and Bellingshausen seas. 62 Since no actual oil has been tapped, these
estimates are based upon the amount of associated gases that were
discovered while drilling the holes. Recent estimates by the United
States Geological Survey have estimated that these three areas have
a potential yield ranging from 19 to 203 billion barrels.63 In
comparison, the Prudhoe Bay oil field of Alaska's northern slope is
60 Ibid, 127.
61 Christopher C. Joyner and Sudhir K. Chopra, eds., The Antarctic Legal
Regime (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), 131.
62Auburn, 245.
63 Betsey Carpenter, "Opening the Last Frontier," U.S. News & World Report . 24
October 1988, 66.
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considered a supergiant field, which has little more than 9 billion
barrels of oil and measures only about 20 kilometers across.64
There is however, some dissent in the field of geology as to just
how reliable these estimates are. According to David H. Elliot, a
geologist at Ohio State University and director of the Byrd Polar
Research Center, "far too few test holes have been drilled or scientific
soundings conducted to locate any major deposits." He further points
out that the construction of offshore drilling rigs would pose a
greater risk and be much more expensive to operate than rigs in
other similar conditions, presumably because of the extreme water
depths. 65
In any case the potential for extremely large hydrocarbon
deposits has been proven, whether or not it contains 19 billion or
203 billion barrels is not the issue. The exact amount of reserves,
estimated costs of production and technical details can be worked out
once the decision to actually begin production is made. But first the
much broader issue of allowing for the establishment of a mineral
and hydrocarbon regime must be addressed.
C. THE WELLINGTON CONVENTION
In 1982 talks began in Wellington, New Zealand to establish some
international guidelines for the potential mining and drilling in the
64Malcome W. Browne, "France and Australia Kill Pact on Limited Antarctic
Mining and Oil Drilling," New York Times . 25 September 1989, A10L.
65 Ibid.
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Antarctic region. Although there has been a voluntary moratorium
on mining, drilling and prospecting since 1977, it was generally felt
that some formal guidelines needed to be established before some
international crisis prompting extensive oil exploration occurred or
minerals were discovered in commercially extractable quantities.
The convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities, more commonly know as the Wellington Convention, was
chaired by Christopher Beeby, a diplomat from New Zealand's foreign
office, who noted that such a scramble would jeopardize not only the
environment but the Antarctic Treaty itself. 66 On 2 June 1988 the
33 nations involved in the negotiations reached an agreement on the
framework by which to regulate the mining of the Antarctic.
Mr. Beeby also prepared the draft resolution which detailed
guidelines for the regime and called for the establishment of a
commission, an advisory committee, secretariat and regulatory
committees. The convention states that decisions about mining
activities "shall be based on information adequate to enable informed
judgments to be made and no such activities shall take place unless
this information is made available..." These activities will not be
permitted if they will cause a significant change to the Antarctic
environment. 67 The first step for a potential prospector would
66David Clark Scott, "Treaty Opens Up World's Last Untouched Continent To
Mining," Christian Science Monitor . 7 June 1988, 9.
67 Majorie Sun, "Antarctica Pact Could Open Way for Mining," Science . 17 June
1988, 1612.
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involve the collection of samples to determine where the mine
should be constructed.
The convention calls for this to be done in an environmentally
safe manner. In order to ensure compliance with this requirement,
the prospecting state is required to notify the Secretariat of the
details of the search such as location, type of minerals sought and
duration of the search three months prior to the commencement of
prospecting. This information would then be disseminated to the
various Commission members for their consideration. Prospecting
may begin on the date submitted to the Secretariat providing that no
other commission member objects. If an objection by any one
member arises, a meeting must be scheduled within three months to
discuss the issue.68 Prospecting under the guidance of the Antarctic
Treaty came under the rubric of scientific exploration. The
information collected under the auspices of the treaty was required
to be disseminated among the member nations. Under the
Wellington Convention this same information would the property of
the prospecting nation and would require dissemination only after
ten years.
If the prospecting reveals a potential lode, then the prospecting
state petitions the Commission for an application to "explore" the
area more thoroughly. If approved, this would involve drilling,
dredging or blasting and the submission of an environmental impact
68 Myhre, 102.
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report detailing the exact minerals to be mined and the method of
exploration to be used etc. Once a positive determination has been
made, a regulatory committee, composed of the requesting state,
claimants in whose claim the the area lies, the United States, the
Soviet Union, (plus the claimants may appoint up to three other
parties), is established. After the claimant states have been
established, the committee chairman appoints an equal number of
non-claimant states to the committee. 69 The advisory committee
then considers the environmental impact on the area, the financial
solvency of the operator, and whether or not there is sufficient
technical expertise to operate the project. The process continues in
the same manner, passing through various other committees until a
final determination is made.
The Convention requires that there be a unanimous vote by all 21
voting nations before permission is granted for an operator to begin
exploration. Mr. Beeby states that he "knows of no other national
law, certainly not in New Zealand, that says you can't mine in area X
or chop down trees in area Y unless all interested groups say, 'yes'."
Additionally the convention requires, for example, that if an oil spill
occurs, then the mining operator would be held liable for the clean
up and be required to restore the ecosystem to its pre-spill condition.
69 Ibid, 102-103. The United States and the Soviet Union are permanent
members on this committee and will always be a part of the process.
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If the operator fails to comply or falls short on the restoration
process, then the sponsoring nation will be held responsible.70
Ratification of the Wellington Convention with its oil spill
provision would effectively prevent a repeat of the 31 January 1988,
Bahia Paraiso aftermath in which the Argentine ship struck a
pinnacle while exiting a channel and subsequently sank. 71 Elaborate
plans were made to clean up the spill but as of February 1990 no
effort had been made by the Argentines to begin to clean up the
55,000 gallons of diesel fuel that continues to leak from the stricken
ship. 72
Despite the checks and balances that are seemingly built into the
convention, it has nonetheless drawn considerable criticism from
such environmental groups as Greenpeace and the Cousteau Society.
They contend that the effects of an oil spill could last for over 100
years and point out that in the proposed convention, operators are
not liable if damages result from a "natural disaster of an exceptional
character," or an act of terrorism, or war. Additionally, they liken
the "unanimous consent requirement" to horse-trading, saying that
70 Sun, 1612.
71
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no one will vote against anyone else because turn-about is fair
play. 73
The solution that environmentalists seek is a total and complete
ban on all mining and drilling activities in the Antarctic in favor of
the establishment of a "wilderness park." 74 In that vein, they
lobbied long and hard for the 21 treaty nations to reject the
proposed Wellington Convention. The lobbying effort has apparently
been successful because Australia and France thus far refused to
ratify the convention. 75 In order for the Convention to enter into
effect, 16 of the countries that adopted the plan at the negotiations
must ratify it. Additionally, of the 16, all seven of the claimant
nations, plus the United States and the Soviet Union, and seven
others of which three must be developing countries.76
This refusal to ratify the Convention does not kill the ratification
process but will require a concerted effort on the part of the other
nations who have already ratified the convention, to persuade these
two countries to adopt it. On 23 September 1989, Senator Albert
Gore Jr. (D. Tennessee) announced his support for the "wilderness
park" concept by introducing a resolution in the Senate calling for a
73 Scott, 10.
74 Talks in Paris on Protecting Antarctic Fail," New York Times . 22 October 1989,
16.
75 Browne, A10.
76James E. Mielke, "Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities: Regulate or
Prohibit?," Congressional Research Service 11 (November-December 1990): 23.
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stronger Antarctic agreement that would establish a "global
ecological commons there preserving the continent in its nearly
pristine state." Tucker Scully, Director of Ocean and Polar Affairs for
the State Department, stated that the official U.S. view "opposed an
outright ban on mining because it could be easily overridden in the
event of a large oil or mineral discovery," and adds that it is better to
have a system in place than none at all.77
Despite the seven years of negotiations and the Convention's
adoption by the a consensus of the negotiation's delegates, including
the United States, the U.S. Congress significantly undermined the
chances for its ratification when Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), and
other environmentally minded politicians, recently introduced a bill
into the Senate, S2575 (Appendix B.) that would make it a crime for
any American to engage in mining operations in the Antarctic. The
Senate passed their version of the bill on 14 September 1990 while
the House passed their version on 27 September. 78 The President
has yet to sign the bill into law.
This congressional action sent a strong message to a meeting in
Chile in December 1990 considering the possibility of closing all
mining activities for a period of 30 to 50 years. During the meeting
there were only three nations, England, Japan and South Korea who
77
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were opposed to such a permanent ban. Curtis Bohlen, head of the
U.S. delegation, speculated that a final international decision will be
reached in the Fall of 1991.79
Such international action is likely to kill any final hope of
ratification of the Wellington Convention. There are compelling
arguments on both sides of the issue. But the enforcement of any
international mining ban, as Tucker Scully has suggested, is only
good as long no minerals or hydrocarbon deposits are discovered.
79
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Between 1908 and 1946, seven nations laid territorial claims to
the Antarctic continent: Argentina, Chile, Great Britain, (whose claims
overlap), Norway, New Zealand, Australia and France. The first
negotiations for Antarctic territory took place between Chile and
Argentina from 1906 until 1908. The agreement was almost
complete when the Argentine minister of foreign affairs resigned,
and ultimately left the proposal a dead issue. Sensing an urgency
and seeing an opportunity in the confusion, the United Kingdom
made the first formal claim on 21 July 1908 and based it on its
previous exploration and discoveries made in the region.80 Thus
began the Antarctic land appropriation era.
The period between 1908 and 1938 saw little interest by other
nations in making territorial claims. The only claims that were
staked during this period were a result of the joint Australian, New
Zealand and British BANZARE expedition of 1929-31. Great Britain
granted New Zealand the Ross Dependency and in 1933 Australian
made its own two sector claim. 81 However, as WWII approached
world attention was refocused on the Antarctic. This renewed
80 Maria Luisa, "Chile's Antarctic Claims," Financial Times of London . 12
February 1990, in ISLA.
81 Beck, 29.
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interest was sparked by the presence of the German catapult ship,
Schwabenland, carrying two seaplanes, off of the Antarctic coast in
1938. Its was dispatched by Hitler for the purpose of claiming a
portion of Antarctica for the Third Reich. The seaplanes flew over the
continent dropping markers to designate the German claim. 82 By this
time Germany had already reoccupied the Rhineland (March 1936)
and had annexed Austria by 13 March 1938. 83 Based on these
actions, the Europeans and others with Antarctic interests were not
comfortable with Hitler possessing territory in the Antarctic,
therefore, Norway and France laid their official claims to the
continent in 1939 and Argentina and Chile made formal claims in
1940 and 1943 respectively (see Map l). 84
B. ARGENTINE CLAIMS
In 1942 the Primero de Mayo left on a voyage designed to
exactly delineate Argentina's 1940 paper claim to the continent and
its insular regions. The claim was to be made from a point radiating
from the South Pole and bounded by 60 degrees south latitude and
between 25 and 74 degrees west longitude. 85 As the ship made its
82White, 8.
83 William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1980), 1011-1012.
84Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1985), 135.
85 Child, Antarctica, 1988, 65.
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voyage, it stopped at various points along the way to deposit bronze
plaques and plant the Argentine flag as a symbol of Argentine
sovereignty. The following year the Primero de Mayo returned,
carrying three Chilean observers, to the spots where the plaques had
been deposited only to find the one left on Deception Island had been
removed and replaced by the British. The British had left a message
stating that the island and whaling station were the property of the
Crown. Undaunted, the Argentines left yet another plaque with their
own message, but nothing ever came of the incident.86
As with the claim to the Falklands, Argentina points to the Treaty
of Tordesillas of 1494 as justification of its claim to the Antarctic
sector. The treaty drew the boundary between Spanish and
Portuguese claims with the dividing line running from pole to pole
along 53 degrees west longitude. Everything to the east belonged to
Portugal and everything to the west was deemed Spanish territory.
This treaty had replaced the Papal Bull of 1493 which gave Spain the
rights to its New World possessions and the surrounding water in
order to control trade. 87 When Latin America won its independence
from Spain, all property rights supposedly transferred as well.
Additionally, the uti possidetis of 1810 is cited as the principle by
which each Latin American nation adheres to the former Spanish
86White, 9. According to Child, Antarctica, 1988, the document was taken from
the island and handed over to the British Ambassador who returned it the
Argentine government in Buenos Aires.
87 Falklands/Malvinas: Whose War? (London: Latin American Bureau, 1982),
30.
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Provincial boundaries. This principle was originally designed to
forestall any attempts by other European nations to claim land in the
New World. According to the principle "all land in Spanish America,
no matter how remote or inhospitable is deemed to have been part
of one of the former administrative divisions of colonial rule." The
main issue is not the validity of the principle itself but rather the
reliability of the charts and maps in relationship to the actual
boundaries. The major argument against uti possidetis is that it can
only be applied to lands to which Spain had title in 1810. Great
Britain, for example, claims res nullius and is quick to point out that
there is little to no evidence to suggest otherwise with regards to the
Antarctic. 88
The Argentines cite various other justifications for their claim
such as propinquity, geological continuity, rescue activities,
permanent occupation and administrative activities. The propinquity
argument points out that Argentina, and for that matter Chile, is
twice as close to the Antarctic land mass as any other claimant (New
Zealand). Geological continuity is borne out by the Gondwanaland
theory and the fact that the same minerals are found in the Antarctic
peninsula as are present in the Andes. One classic example of a
rescue operation took place in 1903 when the Argentine ship
Uruguay rescued the Swedish Nordenskjold expedition. Permanent
occupation of the region south of 60 degrees south is cited by the
88 Auburn, 49-50.
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continuous occupation of the Laurie Island meteorological station in
the South Orkneys since 1904, forty years before any other nation.
The Laurie Island facility also fulfills their administrative
requirement for enhancement of their sovereignty claim, by virtue of
the establishment of the first post office in the region in 1904.89
Because of a growing geopolitical awareness, the Argentines first
established bases on the Antarctic continent in 1947 as a means of
further strengthening their sovereignty claim. According to Jack
Child, "there is a strongly developed "Antarctic consciousness" in
Argentina, and a deeply held belief that the nation will never be
complete until the various parts of Argentina (South American,
Insular, Antarctic, and the Argentine Sea) are under full Argentine
control." 90 A prime example of this perspective, is borne out by a
close examination of the Bahia Paraiso incident. The Antarctic
channel through which the ship transited was explicitly delineated
on the U.S. and British charts showing "dangerous ledges and
pinnacles." The Argentine captain chose to ignore warnings from the
U.S. representatives and ultimately put a 30 foot gash in the stern of
his ship, causing it to sink. His actions undoubtedly arise from the
strong Argentine conviction of sovereignty of the territory. 91 In
89 Child, Antarctica, 1988, 69.
90 Philip Kelly and Jack Child, eds., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and
Antarctica (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 194.
91 Bruce S. Manheim Jr., "Antarctica: The Fragile Last Frontier," Christian
Science Monitor. 23 March 1989, 19.
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February 1988, marking the 84th anniversary of Argentina's
presence in the Antarctic, Minister Horacio Juanarena said that "this
presence was a kind of destiny closely linked to the rest of Argentine
life... that in government we feel that our legitimate sovereignty
claims in the area shall be strengthened that day before the world by
the testimony of the true, professional and effective scientific
activity developed by our men in that portion of a hostile land."92
If and when the time ever comes to defend an Antarctic claim,
the key element that will be used in the determination of
sovereignty will be the examination of the degree to which
occupation of the disputed sector, by the claimant nation, has
occurred. In view of this occupation requirement, Argentina began
to settle families on the continent and was the first to produce a
native Antarctican, born in 1978. 93 Argentina will continue to take
every opportunity to establish any sort of activity that will enhance
its chances for a favorable ruling on the sovereignty issue. In
December 1987, President Alfonsin noted in a send-off speech to a
group of Argentine scientists and military personnel, that their
presence in the Antarctic: "will contribute to reaffirming the legal,
geographical, political and historical record concerning our rights in
the Antarctic... this task epitomizes the country's vast human and
9 2"Juanarena Views Antarctic Sector, Treaty," in FBIS. Lat 88-036, Buenos Aires
Herald in English, 23 February 1988, 11.
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material effort to support its rights which no doubt are marked by
eight decades of generous dedication." 94
C. CHILEAN CLAIMS
With regards to Antarctica, the Chileans are just as adamant
about their claim as the Argentines. The Chileans claim that
possession of the Antarctic was first given to them in 1539 by
Charles V in a decree giving them charge of all territory south of the
Strait of Magellan. They also cite such other decrees as the Royal
Edict of 29 May 1555, which appointed a governor to Chile and at the
same time charged him with exploration of the lands "around" the
Strait of Magellan. Three years latter the governor died and
Francisco de Villagra was appointed. King Ferdinand I instructed the
new governor to explore the territory south of the strait and that:
"possession be taken in our name of the lands and providences which
fall within the demarcation of the Crown of Castillo, putting the
crosses and signs and making the necessary statement in witness
thereof." 95 In 1556, the 16th century Spanish poet, Alonso de Ercilla
noted in his poem, La Araucana, that Chile was "famous" in the
Antarctic." 96
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In a report to the "Council of Indias," in 1761 the Chileans listed
Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego and the known Antarctic islands as
belonging to Chile. After this period Chile pursued the legitimation of
its claims in much the same manner as Argentina, for example,
pointing to the principle of uti possidetis, continuing to make various
other decrees and establishing whaling stations.97
In the twentieth century Chile too has realized the importance of
propinquity, geological continuity, occupation, administrative
activities and rescue operations in order to enhance its chances of
successfully defending any future sovereignty claims. The Chilean
sector stems from the South Pole to 60 degrees south latitude and is
bounded on the east and west by 53 and 90 degrees west longitude
respectively. The rationale for the dimensions of the sector came
partly from the Treaty of Tordesillas and the Rio Pact of 1947. The
eastern most boundary of the treaty put the Spanish possessions
west of 53 degrees west. During the negotiations for the Rio Pact,
Argentina and Chile wanted Antarctica to be subject to the pact as
well. Publicly the reason given for inclusion of Antarctica was
protection of their individual Antarctic territorial claims from extra-
hemispheric belligerents, but at the individual government level,
Argentina and Chile desired hemispheric protection against each
other. This area was deemed to be bracketed by 24 and 90 degrees
97 Mercq, 92-94.
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west longitude and is sometimes referred to as the South American
sector. 98
Chile has also established many bases in the region, mostly on the
Antarctic Peninsula and has taken steps to colonize it. For example,
in 1984 the Chilean government solicited six families to move to King
George Island. In only one year three babies had been born and six
more families had moved to the area." The Lieutenant Marsh Base
is only two and one half hours by air from Punta Arenas and has a
hotel with accommodations for 80, both air and sea transportation to
the mainland, air traffic control (ATC) facility, mail and cargo service,
radio station, hospital and rescue teams. There are six other nations
with bases on the island and all take advantage of the opportunity to
use the facilities. 100 In a 1984 statement to the United Nations,
Chile's ambassador stated that "Chile attaches tremendous
importance to the question of Antarctica, for that issue affects Chile's
very existence and unless careful steps are taken to protect
Antarctica. ..as has been the case so far. ..the consequences may be
dangerous." 101
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D. BRITISH CLAIMS
The British sector radiates from the South Pole north to 50°S
20°W, continuing west to 50°S 50°W, south to 58°S 50°W, thence to
58°S 80°W. Because of the asymmetrical shape of the wedge, Great
Britain was not only able to include its Antarctic claim but also the
South Atlantic islands to which it lays claim. Map 1 illustrates the
confluence of the conflicting claims between Argentina, Chile and
Great Britain. 102 This British territory falls under the administrative
jurisdiction of the governor of the Falkland Islands and is deemed
the Falkland Island Dependencies (FID). The British base their claim
on discovery and occupation of various whaling stations on the
southern islands. 103 s
In December 1947, Great Britain, wishing to avert any future
conflict, felt confident enough to submit its Antarctic claim to the
International Court of Justice for arbitration. However, Argentina
and Chile were unwilling to participate in the arbitration process.
Instead, the two countries drafted the Donoso-La Rosa declaration in
March 1948, whose goal, even though Argentina and Chile had
conflicting claims, was to mutually agree that the British claim was
unfounded. The document stated that: "Until a settlement is reached
by amicable agreement regarding the boundary limits in adjacent
102Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Strategy in the Southern Oceans (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1989), 87.
103 Lane, 21-22.
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Antarctic territories of the Argentine Republic and Chile. ..both
Governments [sic] will act in mutual agreement in the protection and
legal defense of their rights in the South American Antarctic, lying
between the meridians of 25° and 90° West, within the territories of
which the Argentine Republic and Chile are recognized as having
unquestionable sovereignty rights." 104 Great Britain attempted again
in 1955 to have the situation arbitrated by the International Court,
but once again the two South American nation refused to submit to
the proceedings.
The intense competition between nations for control of a portion
of the Antarctic was the driving force behind final ratification of the
Antarctic Treaty in 1961. Each nation had its own justification for
operations in the region, including geopolitical expansion of their own
nation, harvesting of whales and other mammals, speculation on the
continent's potential mineral wealth and purely scientific desires.
These reasons provide ample cause for increased international
tensions between the nations involved, especially those three with
overlapping claims. These three countries have each insisted they are
the only true benefactor of the disputed sector. Many of the
justifications used by Argentina, Chile and Great Britain are valid. If
they were not, the nation with the proper and legal documentation
would certainly by now have been able to substantiate its claim in
the international arena. The mere fact that Chile and Argentina
104 Beck, 34-35.
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refused to participate in arbitration with Great Britain regarding the
claims suggests they too realize the validity of each claim.
48
V. GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Although the Antarctic treaty has effectively stalled any major
conflict over the Antarctic in terms of sovereignty claims and
military usage, it has had no influence on issues occurring north of
60 degrees south latitude. There are a number of issues in this
region, such as the Beagle Channel and Falklands/Malvinas conflicts,
that geopolitical thinkers in both Argentina and Chile have managed
to keep alive. Geopolitical writers of the Southern Cone tend to
emphasize a "manifest destiny" attitude when conveying their
concepts and rationale for expansion of their particular territorial
boundaries. 105 Mainly because of Japanese and German expansive
goals during World War II, geopolitical concepts were
understandably unpopular immediately following the war. However,
the concept never found the same disfavor in Argentina, Chile or
Brazil, probably because of their relative isolation and disassociation
with the war as compared to the United States, Europe, the Soviet
Union and east and southeast Asia.
As a whole Latin America was relatively uninvolved in WWII. Of
Argentina, Chile and Brazil, the latter contributed the most to the war
effort. Relative to the geographical range of the war, Brazil was also
the most strategically located nation in Latin America because of its
proximity to the African coast and the air routes being used to
105 Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1985), 5-6.
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resupply allied aircraft to the European theater. Consequently in
1941, Brazil agreed to let the U.S. use its airfields as way points. The
Brazilian Navy also participated in escort operations in the South
Atlantic and in 1942 formally declared war on both Germany and
Italy. 106
As for Chile and Argentina, possibly because of their geographical
positions and the ethnicity of the countries, both remained neutral
for nearly the entire war. It wasn't until it looked for certain that
the Axis powers had lost in early 1945 that both Chile and Argentina
declared war on Germany and Japan. Because of this neutrality, from
the international point of view, both countries were perceived to be
pro-Axis, which tended to stigmatize their respective geopolitical
concepts.
A. ARGENTINE GEOPOLITICAL VIEWS
Argentina has long sought to achieve great nation status and
disassociate itself from the economic and social shortcomings often
attributed to South American nations. It has often distanced itself
from its neighbors with its overall national attitude but at the same
time drawn them into intense international conflict because of its
expansive goals in the South Atlantic. Argentine geopoliticians are
not always in complete agreement as to the exact methods that
should be pursued in order to achieve these goals. Some writers
106Robert L. Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History 1810-1987 (Washington,
D.C.: United States NAval Institute Press, 1987), 152.
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accepted the basic tenets of the German school of geopolitical
thinking and have never separated themselves from the association
with Nazism, while other writers clearly made a break. The
Argentine writers have also been labeled as "reactive" toward Brazil
and Chile, Argentina's two most challenging geopolitical rivals in the
region. Argentina has long felt that it has suffered geopolitical
aggression at the hands of both of these countries, while Great Britain
is its major extra-continental geopolitical adversary. Argentina has
expressed geopolitical hostility toward the United States as well,
because of U.S. association with Great Britain during the Falklands
conflicts of 1832 and 1982. 107
The major reason for Argentine geopolitical conflict with Brazil
lies in the fact that Argentina perceives itself as the natural
hegemonic power in the Southern Cone. Consequently, it views
Brazilian expansionism as a direct affront to the accomplishment of
Argentine predominance in the southwest Atlantic, as well as a
stumbling block to recuperation of the Falklands. Argentina's
concern is mainly derived from earlier Brazilian expansionism into
the Rio de la Plata region and along the vast frontier of the interior
known as "La Marcha al Oeste." It fears that Brazil's quest to become
a two ocean nation will result in Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia being
removed from the Argentine sphere of influence. 108
107 Child, Geopolitics, 1985, 42.
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Presently, however, Argentina is most interested in the South
Atlantic islands, including the Falklands, South Georgia, South
Sandwich, Antarctic and Beagle Channel. On 26 April 1989, the
Argentine Chamber of Deputies approved a law creating the nation's
twenty-third province, which included the Falklands, Georgias and
South Sandwich islands, which are currently under British control. 109
The law, which President Menem vetoed, either erroneously or
purposefully included two Chilean held islands in the Beagle Channel.
Although Argentina officially recognized these islands as Chilean
territory after the Peace and Friendship Treaty was ratified on 29
November 1984, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the
islands were intentionally included, given Argentina's aggressive
geopolitical thinking. As for the inclusion of the British-held islands,
it would seem to be just another posturing effort to help substantiate
its sovereignty claims when the issue resurfaces. Peronist Whip,
Jorge Yoma, stated that: "inclusion of the Falklands as part of
Argentina's twenty-third province would not affect British and
Argentine relations." 110 The reason that it would not have affected
relations is probably because Great Britain would not have
109
"Menem To Veto Law Over Islands Sovereignty," Santiago Radio Chilena
Network in Spanish 11 May 1990, in FBIS Lat 90-093, 14 may 1990, 50. The
Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich islands are under the purview of
the Antarctic Treaty and as such remain in British control because these
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110
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recognized this or any other maneuvering by Argentina to gain
possession of the disputed islands.
Geopolitically, Argentina seems to be primarily concerned with its
maritime and Antarctic goals. As such, it has developed a maritime
geostrategy that is designed to yield sea control in the southwest
Atlantic, as depicted in Map 2. Argentine geopoliticians contend that
Antarctica figures prominently into this plan because it provides a
geographically defensible position from which to operate, with the
South Pole providing a convenient position from which to begin
demarcation of the Mar Argentino 111 .
The Drake Passage presently has little strategic significance other
than for local shipping and fishing operations, but would take on a
new dimension if the Panama Canal were to closed down. Currently
about 100 ships per month pass through the Drake Passage. With
the canal disabled this number would increase to over 1000. 112
Some Argentine geopoliticians would also argue that control of the
disputed Beagle Channel area would give the Argentines complete
access to the passage from two sides, thus providing effective control
of the 600-mile waterway. The concept has some merit, but fails to
consider that there are alternate shipping routes and that controlling
m White, 56-59.
112Jose T. Merino, Admiral, CinC Chilean Navy, "Trouble in the Southern
Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1986): 81.
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the choke point will have an added degree of difficulty due to the
extreme weather conditions that can arise. 113
The Mar Argentino or Argentine Sea concept was developed
partly as a result of an agreed extension of the territorial waters to
200 nautical miles between Argentina and Uruguay, the
Falklands/Malvinas War and the beagle Channel conflict. 114 This
would suggest that the Argentines are still very much concerned
with geopolitics even though relations between them and the
Brazilians are improving. The Argentines seem not to be content
with rehashing old concepts but are concerned as well with
developing new ones to account for the changing geopolitical
environment.
B. CHILEAN GEOPOLITICAL VIEWS
Chilean geopolitical thought has its roots in German geopolitical
concepts, as do Argentina and Brazil, however, what distinguishes
Chile from other Latin American nations is its relative isolation and
unique geography. 115 These two aspects, combined with Chile's
expansion to the north during the War of the Pacific, the loss of
Patagonia during the same period, the projection of sea power along
its coast and southern insular regions and rule by Chile's foremost





Guerra del Ejercito and author, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
have given Chile its own unique brand of Southern Cone
geopolitics. 116
There are two significant schools of geopolitical thought in Chile.
The first is the Terra Austalis school which espouses four concepts:
(1) the coming of the "era of the Pacific," (2) the geographical
importance of Chile's location, (3) the geostrategic responsibility of
Chile for continental defense and its own destiny, (4) Chile as a
Southern Pacific power. This group of geopolitical thinkers also
postulated the Arc of the Southern Antilles in 1951 (see Map 3).
Control of this region would allow Chile access to the Atlantic Ocean,
thus making Chile a two ocean power. This school also proposed the
idea of a Chilean Sea that would extend from the mainland to Easter
Island and south to the South Pole, encompassing the Chilean
Antarctic claim. 117
The second school of thought comes from the Academia de Guerra
del Ejercito. The school has published two significant works on the
subject; one by General Pinochet, Geopolitica, and Leyes que se
Deducen del Estudio de la Expansion de los Estados, authored
by Julio von Chrismar. These works by no means postulate any new
or innovative ideas, but rather are critiques of current theory in




suggestions. They do, however, stress the importance of human
involvement in the determination of the prosperity of the nation.
Howard Pittman writes that: "Although there are frequent references
to German theorists, the emphasis is on a strong, unified, well-
educated, well-led population, able to overcome the obstacles of
geography and make the best of the resources of the state-reflecting
the influence of the ideas of the French geographers..." 118
The Chileans have gone to great lengths to develop their
geopolitical policies, because it is extremely useful in the
achievement of their ultimate goal of "great nation" status, a common
theme among all Southern Cone countries. In order to promulgate
these geopolitical theories, the Army War College has begun training
and certifying civilian professors to instruct in such areas. On the
practical side, Pinochet completely reorganized the country under a
plan dubbed the "Regionalization of Chile." This plan addressed the
development and security of the northern and southern most
portions of the country. It also revised regional boundaries and
created new provinces in an effort to better integrate the country. 119
It is difficult to speculate whether or not this emphasis on
geopolitical concepts will continue under current President Aylwin,
118 Ibid. Pinochet mainly analyzes the geopolitical writings of the United




or future civilian/military governments, but if precedent is any
indication then it most likely will.
C. BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL VIEWS
Traditionally, Brazilian geopoliticians have concentrated their
concerns on the vast interior of the country, oriented along two east-
west axes. The first is through the Amazon Basin and the second
demarcated by the Bolivian cities of Cochabamba, Sucre and Santa
Cruz, commonly known as the "Magic Triangle." Brazil's most
esteemed geopolitician, the late Golbery da Couto e Silva, also devised
a grand strategy for the division of the entire continent into five
regions: reserve area, Amazon area, Plata-Patagonia, continental
welding area and Brazilian Northeast. 120 The late 1960's witnessed a
rise in maritime geopolitical writing, but Brazil has never placed the
same emphasis on this aspect as Argentina and Chile. 121 However,
this lack of maritime concern is not in the least indicative of a de-
emphasized geopolitical school of thought. Quite the contrary. Jack
Child notes:
120virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Strategy in the Southern Oceans . (New York:
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121 White, 65-66.
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the Brazilian geopolitical school is without a doubt the most
significant in Latin America. This is true not only because of its
impact on contemporary Brazil, but also because it has served as
a model for others and has produced strongly reactive
geopolitical thinking, especially in Argentina. 122
Despite the widely recognized grandioseness of Brazilian
geopolitical thinking in the past, they have not made any formal
claims to the Antarctic and showed little if any interest in the region
until the mid 1950's, when Therezinha de Castro published her
article on the "Frontage" theory in Revista do Clube Militar. This was
a concept designed to more equitably divide Antarctica to include
some Latin American nations previously uninvolved in the region.
Brazil did participate in the IGY and in the early 1970's Euripides
Cardoso de Menezes campaigned in the Brazilian National Congress
for a Brazilian claim to the region. In 1982, Brazil established the
Comissao Nacional para Assuntos Antarticos (CONANTAR) or National
Commission for Antarctic Affairs, charged with developing Brazil's
Antarctic program. In September 1983 Brazil was accepted as a
Consultative member to the Antarctic Treaty and the 1985-86 season
saw the first wintering over at the Brazilian, Comandante Ferraz
Base. 123 Child suggests that, "The presence of the superpowers and
their allies in the region, and especially on the nearby Antarctic
peninsula, stimulates their interest and suggests to them that
122Child, Geopolitics, 1985, 34.
123 Child, Antarctica, 1988, 138-139.
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something important must be there, or these powers would not be
troubling themselves." 124
Seeing that Brazil has no substantial historical precedent for a
claim to the Antarctic, the frontage theory has been highly tauted as
the definitive answer to the Antarctic demarcation problem (see Map
4). The theory is based purely upon the geographical position of
each South American county in relationship to the Antarctic. It allots
a section of Antarctica to Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay as well as Brazil. Of course, the obvious losers in this
concept are Argentina and Chile. Argentina would have the most to
lose under this concept, surrendering 38 degrees 40 minutes with
Chile losing 23 degrees. 125 However, there is one advantage for
Argentina, in that the Falkland Islands fall into the Argentine sector,
but the British are no more likely to recognize this plan than any
other the Argentines can suggest. Additionally, not all of the islands
that would fall into the "Argentine Sea" concept are included in the
frontage theory, therefore the Argentines are not likely to support
this theory either.
Brazil is not the only nation to suggest alternatives when dealing
with Antarctica. In 1987 Malaysia introduced a resolution that was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, calling for the




universal interest in the continent by inviting a U.N. representative
to be present at all meetings of the Antarctic Treaty regime. All of
the Consultative nations plus 17 Non-Consultative nations boycotted
the balloting and issued a joint proclamation stating their resolve not
to change the status quo. The treaty members felt that any attempt
to internationalize the current system would cause the claimant
states to reaffirm their territorial sovereignty claims. The Third
World nations, who favor this internationalization of the Antarctic,
have demanded that the continent's potential mineral wealth be the
"common heritage" of all nations. To further legitimize their
assertions, these "have nots" maintain that their expertise is required
to monitor and help direct activities in order to maintain the
continent's ecological balance. 126
Other than seeking the fulfillment of their manifest destiny,
Brazilian geopoliticians cite security, ecology and economic needs, for
showing an interest in the Antarctic. The main economic opportunity
Brazil foresees is an alternative energy source. 127 Brazil is currently
one of the major importers of petroleum among third world
industrializing nations. In addition to a daily production of 580,000
barrels/day, Brazil imports nearly 600,000 b/d from the Middle East
to meet its commercial and domestic demands. Although domestic
production has increased 300 percent since 1973, there is still an
126 Michael J. Berlin, "U.N. Members Seek Role in Antarctic Treaty,"
Washington Post. 19 November 1987, A51.
127 Child, Geopolitics, 1988, 199.
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ever-increasing need to boost domestic production to meet a 1.1
million b/d daily requirement. It is estimated that 77 percent of
Brazil's oil has already been discovered. Petrobras' goal is to increase
domestic oil production to 1 million b/d by 1993-94 and to 1.5
million by 1997 or 85 percent to 95 percent of estimated
consumption. 128 Although Brazil has reserves in excess of 2.8 billion
barrels, this pales in comparison to the 51.9 billion barrels in Mexico
or the 59 billion in Venezuela. 129 It is readily apparent why Brazil
has shown an increased interest in the Antarctic in recent years. If
Brazil is to continue the industrialization process and meet growing
domestic needs into the next century, it has no choice but to pursue
all possible options and potential alternatives.
If oil is discovered in an accessible area of Antarctica and its
extraction is technologically and economically feasible, then Brazil
would be able to meet these needs without having to import such an
essential commodity from Venezuela or Mexico. As of now, however,
oil has not been discovered in significant quantities, nor has the
current technology made its extraction in the deeper regions of the
Ross and Weddell Seas practicable. Additionally, the pending
ratification of new international mining bans, such as the type
proposed in a meeting in Chile concluded in December 1990 and
coinciding with the similarly pending U.S. legislation, instead of the
128 Joseph P. Riva Jr., "Technology Boosting Success in Campos Basin," Oil & Gas
Journal . 27 November 1989, 87.
129 Derived from the Oil & Gas Journal . 31 December 1990, 45.
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Wellington Convention, may preclude the Antarctic option for Brazil
as well as every other nation.
Since the nineteenth century, geopolitical concepts and ambitions
have been responsible for much of the conflict between the Southern
Cone nations. The prime motivating factors in the development of
post independence geopolitical theories were Brazil's westward
expansion into the interior, Argentina's struggle to maintain its
borders and its continuous contentions with Chile for control of the
insular regions of the southern tip of the continent, and Chile's
acquisition of the copper rich regions of southern Peru and western
Bolivia during the War of the Pacific from 1879-1884. These
theories have also served to sustain the general population's
collective consciousness of geopolitical goals, thereby justifying the
expansionist objectives of each country.
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VI. STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE INSULAR REGIONS
A. THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CONFLICT
The insular regions of the southern tip of South America have
always been an area of intense competition between Argentina and
Chile for influence and control. The rivalry began soon after each
country received its independence from Spain in the early 1800's
and continues to the present time, albeit with less intensity. There
have been two major treaties or compromises since this time that
have resolved, to some degree, the conflict between these two
nations. The first is known as the boundary treaty of 1881. This
treaty deemed the north-south boundary between Chile and
Argentina, as far south as 52 degrees south latitude, to be the Andes.
It also delineates the east-west boundary as proceeding from that
point in the Andes to Point Dungeness on the north shore of the
Strait of Magellan. The boundary extends south from Cape Espiritu
Santo on the south shore of the eastern portion of the Strait of
Magellan to the Beagle Channel, dividing Tierra del Fuego Island. 130
Article III of the boundary treaty attempts to further define the
distribution of the region as follows: "As for the islands, to the
Argentine Republic shall belong Staten Islands, the small islands next
130Michael A. Morris, The Strait of Magellan . (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1989), 57-58.
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to it, and the other islands there may be on the Atlantic to the east of
Tierra del Fuego and of the eastern coast of Patagonia: and to Chile
shall belong all the islands to the south of the Beagle Channel up to
Cape Horn, and those there may be to the west of Tierra del
Fuego." 131
As can be seen from the foregoing Article, the 1881 Boundary
Treaty did not specifically delineate the islands by name, nor did it
provide specific latitudes and longitudes by which to demarcate key
areas such as the mouth of the Strait of Magellan or the eastern
termination of the Beagle Channel. Consequently, this lack of
specificity has left room for contention to fester between to the
countries. When the area was actually surveyed, it was discovered
that the north-south boundary dividing Tierra del Fuego, which
extended south from Cape Esriritu Santo, cut through San Sabastian
Bay, thus giving Chile unintentional access to the Atlantic. This
oversight eventually led to the Protocol of 1893, which shifted the
north-south boundary slightly to the west thus ensuring Chile did not
have access to the Atlantic. 132
Since the exact eastern terminus of the boundary was unclear,
Argentina contended that the channel turns somewhat south before
131 Taken from The 1881 Boundary Treaty as reproduced in appendix 1 of
Morris.
132Peter Calvert, "Argentina: The Primacy of Geopolitics," The World Today vol
45 #2 (February 1989): 34. An interim measure known as the Zeballos-Matta
Declaration stated that neither nation could usurp legal authority over the
disputed area until the exact boundaries could be sorted out, in keeping with
the spirit of the original Boundary Treaty of 1881.
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reaching the Atlantic, while Chile argued that the channel continued
east. This would not have been a major issue except for the
existence of three islands: Picton, Nueva and Lennox. The three
islands in and of themselves are of little economic significance, but
their value lies in their relative strategic positions at the mouth of
the Beagle Channel. Again, Article III of the 1881 Boundary Treaty
is extremely vague and inconclusive, especially with the portion that
states "...Chile shall belong all the islands to the south of the Beagle
Channel up to Cape Horn..." The Chileans also interpreted "... until it
touches the Beagle Channel...," to mean that since Argentine control
terminates upon touching the Beagle Channel, Chile has complete
sovereignty over this waterway. 133
The Argentine city of Ushauia, located on the southwest corner of
the Argentine portion of Tierra del Fuego, is the world's southern
most city and whose Atlantic, and thus only purely Argentine, access
is through the eastern entrance of the Beagle Channel. The
Argentines feared that General Pinochet had plans to use the
disputed islands as a power projection point to reach far into the
Atlantic past Isla de los Estados to make a seaward claim, based on
the Arc of the Southern Antilles concept, and thus control access to
the Beagle Channel and Antarctica, thereby intruding on Argentina's
133 Morris, 76.
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sphere of influence. 134 Now retired Argentine General Osiris Villegas
best expressed the Argentine sentiment when he stated:
If they take the sovereignty of the southern islands (the Beagle
Channel Islands) away from us, we will have lost sooner or later,
our rights in the South Atlantic and will have compromised our
revindication of the Antarctic Sector, and the corresponding
rights to ocean bottom riches and their exploitation, and even
our claim on the Malvinas Islands. Then we will have ceased to
be what we should be and we will be nothing." 135
B. THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF 1982
In 1977, the two countries had reached a point where both were
willing to submit to arbitration over the disputed region. The task
fell on the International Court of Justice with the final arbiter being
the British Crown. The decision that was handed down awarded the
northern half of the eastern portion of the channel to the Argentines,
while sovereignty over the disputed islands was granted to Chile.
Chile was also recognized to have complete control over the Strait of
Magellan and that Point Dungeness was declared to be on the
Atlantic coast. 136
However, the military government of Argentina felt the arbiters
had acquiesced too much in favor of the Chilean arguments.
Consequently, the decision of 2 May 1977 only served to exacerbate
134 Ibid.
135 Child, Geopolitics, 1985, 78.
136 Morris, 77-78.
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the tensions between the two nations and was ultimately rejected on
23 January 1978 by the Argentines. By the end of 1978, Chile and
Argentina were unable to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
Tensions had increased to the point were armed conflict between
them loomed heavily on the horizon. Hostilities were averted,
however, when both sides agreed to accept mediation by the Holy
See in the Agreement of Montevideo of 8 January 1979. 137
After five years of negotiations, the decision was finally handed
down and signed by Argentina and Chile on 23 January 1984. The
Argentines ratified the agreement on 14 March 1985, with Chilean
ratification coming on 11 April 1985. Although the Argentines did
not completely agree with this arbitration either, there was wide
speculation that it was accepted in order to break with the stigma of
the past military regime and allow the Alfonsin government to begin
anew. One of the major points that arose from the arbitration,
upheld the Argentine contention that Chile should not become a two
ocean nation, either through the mouth of the Strait of Magellan or
the area east of Cape Horn. This effectively ensures Argentine access
to Antarctica and more importantly the agreement explicitly states in
Article 15 of the Final Provisions that the treaty does not affect




VII. THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT
The Antarctic region, including the disputed Tierra Del Fuego
territory, has long been a source of potential conflict between the
two Southern Cone nations. Although both Argentina and Chile have
displayed a propensity for sabre rattling, Argentina has been the one
to actually cross the line between potentiality and reality.
Surprisingly though, it has not done battle with its Latin neighbor,
but rather with its extra-hemispheric nemesis, Great Britain, on two
separate occasions. The Hope Bay incident in February 1952
fortunately resulted in no loss of life, however, the outcome of the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict was not so fortunate. During this 74-day
war between Argentina and Great Britain no less than 712 Argentine
and 225 British soldiers and sailors lost their lives in a conflict that
has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 139 With respect to the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict then, the Hope Bay incident pails in
comparison. Although the incident resulted in no further military
action, it was nonetheless significant because it served to illustrate
the potential for an explosive situation in the region.
In reviewing the issues of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, one
might speculate as to the actual circumstances that prompted the use
of force by Argentina. Such an examination would be potentially
139Gary W. Wynia, Argentina. Illusions and Realities (New York: Holmes and
Meirer Publishers, 1986), 3.
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useful in predicting when a similar outbreak of hostilities may occur
in the Antarctic region. The most important factor in any study of
this issue would seem to be the type of government that was in
power at the time and how the interaction of the Argentine economy,
geopolitical challenges and the human rights issue influenced the
decision to invade the Falklands.
A. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN 1981
Argentina has seesawed between civilian and military
governments through its entire history, with all military
dictatorships coming to power through a coup d'etat. Most recently a
coup was attempted in December 1990 by Colonel Mohamed Ali
Seinaldin against President Carlos Menem. 140 The latest successful
coup occurred in 1976 when Maria Estela Martinez de Peron was
deposed by General Jorge Videla whose military regime continued
until December 1983.
The military, and in particular the army, in Latin America has
been observed as both a blessing and a curse. When it has not been
in power it has both taken the initiative and been cajoled into staging
coup d'etats in order to expel a perceived misguided civilian
government. The Argentine Military is no exception to this rule. The
Argentine officer pledges to uphold the country and not the
constitution and quickly points out to foreigners that the first
140
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Argentine constitution was not enacted until 1853, whereas the army
was created in 1816 prior to independence. One Argentine colonel
was quoted as saying:
I know many American soldiers, and we talk about how they are
pledged to uphold the constitution. I am pledged to uphold the
country. On flag day every June, each officer reaffirms his oath
to the country when he is asked, "Do you swear to the nation to
constantly follow its flag and defend it until death?" 141
This oath has definitely given the Argentine military a sense of
purpose, since they have not participated to any great degree in any
modern armed conflicts, other than the Falklands/Malvinas War in
1982. Even during WWII the country was too divided over the
issues of the war to actively participate in it. This was due in large
part to the vast numbers of German and Italian immigrants who
lived in the country, but who still felt strong ties to their countries of
origin.
The Argentine military has its roots in Latin American
Caudilloism, an extremely strong sense of manliness, honor and
nationalism which still permeates the culture today. This intense
notion of nationalism above all else has been the prime motivating
factor in the continual inability or unwillingness of the military
governments of Argentina from 1976 to 1983 to resolve such
international challenges as the Beagle Channel and
Falklands/Malvinas conflicts. In a speech given by Admiral Isaac
14 Edward Schumacher, "Though unpopular, Argentina Armed Forces Cling to
Power," New York Times . 13 December 1981, sec IV, 1.
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Rojas concerning the Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel conflict
he stated that: "The Pope is fallible in worldly matters" and called the
civilian negotiators "incompetent." 142 By contrast the civilian
government of Raul Alfonsin moved quickly, after taking office in
December 1983, to accept the Papal resolution through referendum.
Additionally, it must be noted that the military government during
this period, under the leadership of General Leopoldo Galtieri, also
invaded the Falklands. Although Alfonsin was unable to normalize
relations with Great Britain after the end of the war in 1982,
President Menem seems to have nearly accomplished this goal. 143
By examining these relatively recent incidents, it becomes evident
that the military governments in Argentina from 1976 to 1983
projected a propensity for inflexibility and aggressiveness that does
not seem to be present in the past two elected civilian regimes.
B. ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF 1981
Because the Hope Bay incident was just that, an incident, any
detailed examination of the Argentine economic situation in 1952
would produce no meaningful data. On the other hand, a review of
142Edward Schumacher, "Papal Solution to Boundary Quarrel Vexes
Argentina," New York Times . 21 January 1981, A10.
143
"Argentines Make First Visit to Falklands War Graves," San Jose Mercury . 19
March 1991, 5A. President Alfonsin was unable to normalize relations with
Great Britain mainly because he would not consent to talks unless the
sovereigntity issue of the islands was addressed, a point which Margaret
Thatcher would not conceed. President Menem agreed to the British terms for
the talks in 1989. Subsequently diplomatic ties were restored in February 1990,
and economic issue are currently being dealt with.
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the economic situation in the years prior to the Falklands/Malvinas
War may serve a more useful purpose.
Argentina's major economic sectors include manufacturing,
agricultural products, petroleum, natural gas and an ever increasing
service sector. As a result of its intensive import substitution
industrialization (ISI) program and Peronist ideals instituted in the
1940's and 1950's, the manufacturing sector became the most highly
developed in South America and surpassed the agricultural sector as
the chief export revenue generator. By 1971, over 91 percent of all
manufactured goods were produced at home, seemingly indicating
the import substitution program was working well. 144
ISI was originally instituted to boost the failing economy in the
1930's by the imposition of higher tariffs and trade barriers. This
provided the indigenous manufacturing companies with an obvious
advantage. By the mid-1 970's the Argentine government wanted to
rejoin the world market economy. The desire stemmed from a
perceived need to improve relations with major economic powers,
namely the United States and the European Economic Community
(EEC), in order to receive the desired loans and stimulate foreign
investment. Consequently, tariffs and import restrictions were eased
in order to stimulate the desired economic results. However,
beginning in 1980 the country entered a recession in which the
industrial sector suffered the most, and in particular the steel
144 David R. Decker, The Political. Economic and Labor Climate in Argentina
(Philidelphia: University Press, 1983), 22-23.
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industry, which dropped from twelve to three manufacturers. Prior
to the mid-1970's, the agricultural sector was a significant factor in
helping Argentina maintain a positive trade balance. But the
continued emphasis on import substitution had left the agricultural
sector in severe disarray. Because this valuable asset was so
neglected it was not able to help sustain the Argentine economy
during this transition period to a free market economy.
Before the recession of 1980, the economy had already begun to
falter. When the junta came to power in 1976, it appointed Jose
Alfredo Martinez de Hoz to address the problem. When he began his
tenure as the economics minister, the annual rate of inflation had
climbed to over 450 percent under the ousted civilian government of
Maria Peron. By 1981 he had managed the economy well enough to
bring inflation down to 50 percent. 145 This was something of a
minor miracle but still short of his own goals for an economic
recovery. The problems began when Mr. Martinez de Hoz allowed
the economy to slow down too much in order to control inflation. His
main tactic was to continually devalue the peso on a fixed schedule, a
policy which had once met with favor, but was no longer supported
by unions and the state-owned corporations. This lack of confidence
by the business and labor sectors also coincided with the
replacement of General Jorge Videla with General Roberto Viola. Mr.
Martinez de Hoz had been given virtually free reign of the country's
145 Edward Schumacher, "Argentine Devaluation Fails to Still Critics," New
York Times. 4 June 1981, D15.
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economy by General Videla, but the new junta leader had his own
personal agenda. Consequently, Mr. Martinez de Hoz resigned his
position and Mr. Lorenzo Sigaut assumed his duties as Economics
Minister. By June of 1981, after only two months in office, the rate
of inflation had once again begun to spiral upwards and the economic
situation was worsening.
There seemed no other alternative to slowing the unrelenting
climb of inflation than to continue with the planned devaluation of
the peso. By July 1981 the peso had dropped from 2000:1 U.S. dollar
in January to 6700:1 U.S. dollar. By October the inflation rate had
reached 100 percent with no relief in sight. There was an ever-
growing number of strikes, as well as demands for the release of
Maria Peron and a growing disdain and lack of confidence in the
military junta. Typical of the sentiment expressed was one truck
driver's response to the country's predicament: "The military school
is the cancer of this country." 146 In short the country was quickly
losing trust and confidence in the military's ability to govern the
nation.
One major contributor to the Argentine economy was an
abundance of foreign investments into the country's natural
resources. From the time the junta came to power in 1976 these
146Edward Schumacher, "Argentine Regime Severely Strained By Economic
Woes," New York Times . 5 July 1981, Al.
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investments amounted to over $3.5 billion with 42 percent coming
from U.S. companies alone. 147
The junta's desire to move away from an economy based on
import substitution was met with stiff resistance from the labor
unions and the manufacturers. The labor unions foresaw a loss of
jobs and the manufacturers knew that competing on the open market
would require large outlays of money. They also realized that there
would be a significant time lag caused by the required modernization
of their plants and resultant retraining of workers, before peak
production could be accomplished and thus the generation of
sufficient revenue. Neither the labor unions nor the manufacturers
were willing to freely make the transition. This factor, in
combination with the rampant inflation and a drop in the foreign
investments, predictably proved to be a very destabilizing situation
and caused the military government's competency to come into
question.
C. HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS
If major economic and political problems were not enough, the
military junta had yet another complicating factor added to their
struggle to maintain control. Know as the guerra sucia or dirty war,
this debacle proved to be more of a stigma to the junta than the
failure of the Falklands/Malvinas campaign. In reality this was not
147 Edward Schumacher, "Argentina's Instability Slows Inflow of Foreign
Investment," New York Times . 26 October 1981, D10.
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in and of itself a separate incident with its own set of causal factors,
but was rather a symptom of the economic and political predicament.
The military junta was constantly at odds with the Peronists and
left-wing organizations, particularly any of the established labor
unions. During the last six months of 1981 the economy began a
devastating slide. In June the nation's foreign reserves fell by $308
million in just one day and was deemed to be "an explosive
situation" 148 The slide continued and by the end of the year the
ailing steel companies' production had dropped from 3203 metric
tons (in December 1979) to 2517 metric tons, a 27.25 percent
reduction in output. Inflation had continued its undaunted upward
spiral (see Table 1), while the gross domestic product declined by 8.9
148
"Financial Panic and Political Rumours Shake Buenos Aires," Latin America
Weekly Report . 5 June 1981, 1.
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percent. 149 Finally, by December the ruling junta felt compelled to
replace General Viola with General Leopoldo Galtieri.
TABLE 1




General Galtieri was well know for his hard-line methodological
approach to dealing with the country's economic and political
problems. But the suppression of dissenting political opinions began
in 1976 when the junta first came to power and only continued
under Galtieri's leadership. As John Sheahan notes:
149 Derived from tables in Argentina: Economic Recovery and Growth
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1988)
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...regimes that suppressed political freedom and human rights
and implemented terrorist programs to eliminate suspected
supporters of all kinds of left-wing causes explained their
purposes in terms of restoring social discipline, returning to free
markets, and ending the General Galtieri was, however, even
more unwilling to deal with the opposition than his
predecessors. The new leader's greatest concern was to avoid at
all costs a repeat of the cordobazo labor riots that completely
overwhelmed the city of Cordoba in 1969. Students and
laborers joined together under a Marxist banner and controlled
the city for two days until they were put down by the military
forces. 150
Since coming to power, the regime had learned that terror, and
more importantly the threat of its use, was extremely effective in
keeping the unions and other opposition at bay, but as they learned
there were international ramifications. During the years of the junta,
an estimated 15,000 persons had disappeared. This large number of
desaparecidos had unfortunately, gotten the attention of the United
States and the EEC, the very entities that could have lent assistance
through monetary investments and loans.
As a result of the human rights violations, a bill sponsored by
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), was passed by the Congress,
barring Argentina from receiving any more military aid from the
United States. This restriction was put into effect by Public Law 95-
92 on 4 August 1977. The law detailed that Argentina, among other
countries, could not receive any loans, credits, sales of defense
articles or services, and that no export licenses could be issued under
150 Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America . (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1986), 188.
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the Arms Control Act. 151 Although this law was passed in August
1977, it would not take affect until after 30 September 1978. The
Carter administration had persuaded the Congress to attach the one-
year waiting period amendment to the bill in order to provide an
incentive to the Argentine government to significantly improve their
human rights record. The Department of State was charged with
evaluating Argentina's progress in human rights and thus would
have the final decision. 152
In reality the law did not stop all military transactions from
taking place. In an effort to avoid complete alienation of the
Argentine junta, the Department of State allowed some business to
be transacted after the 30 September deadline. On 29 September the
Department of State prepared to deny over 200 licenses for
munitions sales and other equipment worth approximately $100
million because the junta had shown little to no progress. But at the
same time the department had approved the training of 30
Argentine officers at selected U. S. bases and the sale of five Chinook
helicopters, two C130 transports and 15 Beechcraft trainers worth
$120 million. 153 Although this may have been somewhat beneficial
to the junta and most certainly lessened the impact of the PL 95-48,
15 international Security and Assistance Act. United St ates Statutes at Larg e.
91, sec. 11, 619 (1980).
152Karen De Young and Charles A. Krause, "Our Mixed Signals on Human
Rights in Argentina," New York Times, 29 October 1978, CI.
153 Ibid.
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it did not provide the Argentines with any major equipment that
would be useful in the impending invasion of the Falklands.
The junta was most severely affected by the mandates of PL 95-
48 in the area of ammunition supplies, communications equipment
and spare parts for previously purchased U.S. equipment. 154 To
compensate for the loss of equipment from the U.S., Argentina
purchased 57 tanks from Austria and one frigate from France in June
1981. 155
The junta tried to compensate for its diminished international
stature as well, especially in the United States and Europe, by hiring
a New York public relations firm to improve its image. The firm
placed advertisements in newspapers and magazines to reach its
target audience of the press, government officials and congressmen,
educators, investment organizations and travel agencies. There was
also pressure placed on the Department of State by businesses which
had had pending contracts adversely affected by PL 95-48. They
contended that absolute imposition of the law would mean economic
ruin for the company and that it would cost the United States $813.5
million. 156
154 Peter J. Ognibene, "The Arms Embargo Myth," Washington Post . 2 July 1978,
B3.
155 Edward Schmacher, "Argentina Said to Buy 57 Tanks From an Austrian
Arms Concern," New York Times . 21 July 1981, A14.
156Qgnibene.
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Although Argentina mounted a serious public relations campaign
on one front, American businessmen, motivated by profits,
attempted to influence the administration's decision on another. Both
efforts proved to be fairly ineffective except for the previously noted
equipment sales. With economic recovery measures failing
miserably and mounting political and human rights pressures, the
junta was slowly running out of options.
By mid-March 1982, all of the external factors that would enter
into the Argentine decision to invade the Malvinas were in place.
Argentina was renewing its drive to resolve the Beagle Channel issue
with Chile, assisting the U.S. -led effort to combat the Sandinistas, 157
and was engaged in a diplomatic confrontation with Great Britain
over sovereignty of the Falklands. At this point the Argentines
began considering their options. The Argentine leadership estimated
that if it went to war with Chile over the Beagle Channel it risked an
escalation that could involve other Latin American nations such as
Brazil, Peru and Bolivia. They also felt that if they became more
involved in Central America this could coalesce the leftist elements
more strongly against the junta. The military government was in
desperate need of a national rallying point that could draw attention
away from the failing economy and human rights issues, one
157 Alan Riding, "Surrender Expected to Bring Better U.S. -Latin Ties," New York
Times . 18 June 1982, All. Argentina had begun supporting the effort to train
the contras in Honduras by sending 40 advisors.
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involving the least risk with the most benefit. An outright invasion
of the Falklands seemed to meet these requirements. 158
Finally, General Galtieri approved invasion plans which had been
drawn up by Admiral Jorge Anaya in late 1981. The invasion had
originally been planned for mid-1982, but because of a worsening
political situation, fostered by the sliding economy, it was moved up
to April. Initially the invasion brought about the desired result. The
general population believed it to be a just cause and the military
government attained its desired domestic control over the unions
and the economy. However, their euphoria was short lived because
of the junta's serious miscalculations of British resolve and American
reaction. General Galtieri later said: "I judged any response from the
English scarcely possible, indeed absolutely improbable." 159




VIII. UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE ANTARCTIC
Why should the U.S. be concerned with affairs in the Antarctic
since no mineral deposits, including oil, have yet been discovered in
minable quantities? Is the Antarctic region of any real economic
importance to the United States? Or is the benefit found in the fact
that the U.S. is a Consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty System
with the ability to be involved in the decision making process,
established in 1959, and therefore able to influence regional
decisions? The U.S. position on Antarctica has changed very little
since the years just prior to the establishment of the ATS. Then, as
now, these interests can be categorized into four specific areas:
regional security, environmental, scientific, and resource. 160
These interests, however, are really part of a larger agenda. The
primary U.S. interest in the Antarctic is that of maintaining the
neutrality of the continent, 161 thus assuring access for the United
states for environmental, resource and scientific reasons but more
importantly ensuring the continued security of the continent. Over
the years, however, these individual areas of interests have acquired
varying degrees of importance, depending upon the international and
160Frank G. Klotz, America on the Ice (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1990), 132.
161 Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Ag e
(Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1985), 204.
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domestic events of the given time. For example, the launching of the
Soviet space program in the late 1950's and its associated military
implications were prime motivating factors in the establishment of
the Antarctic Treaty Organization.
As discussed in Chapter III, environmental concerns, prompted
by the potential for mining in the region, have caused this particular
sub-area to come into sharp focus. This recent increased emphasis
on the environmental aspects of the Antarctic may lead one to
assume that the U.S. is longer interested in its primary goal or even
the other sub-area interests. Indeed, one could easily infer such a
notion from the recent actions by the U.S. Congress with its proposed
comprehensive mining and minerals exploration ban applicable to all
U.S. companies and citizens. When these sub-area interests come
into sharp focus they tend to blur the primary objective of security
in the region. But no matter which sub-area is being emphasized at
the time, they all work together to accomplish the primary objective.
The principal mechanism for accomplishment of this objective is the
Antarctic Treaty System.
A. MAINTENANCE OF THE ATS
The commitment of the ATS members to neutrality is of such
importance that the subject is addressed in the preamble and is the
subject of the very first article of the treaty. The preamble states:
"Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica
shall continue for ever I sicl to be used exclusively for peaceful
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purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international
discord." Maintenance of the current ATS is essential for the U.S. to
continue to meet its primary objective. This is true because the ATS
is very explicit about delineating the conditions that will provide the
best opportunity for accomplishment of this goal. Presently the
emphasis on environmental issues and the maintenance of scientific
research facilities by all Consultative nations throughout the
continent, regardless of who claims the particular sector, helps
maintain the sense of internationalism which in turn contributes to
Antarctica's neutral image, despite the seven territorial claims.
The treaty's importance can best be appreciated by examining
the conditions that would exist if the treaty was not maintained and
the U.S. was forced to assert its claim in the region. The U.S. would
find itself in the same position as prior to the treaty. It would have a
very strong case for a claim to a sector of the continent but would
also find it an extremely difficult diplomatic dilemma. 162 The
decision to claim sovereignty over a given sector would have to be
balanced against the cost in international relations and the risk of
defending such a claim. The U.S., however, may have no choice in the
matter if the ATS breaks down and the other claimant nations begin
162 Article IV. of the Antarctic Treaty address the issue of claims. See
Appendix 1. The U.S. has always reserved the right to make a claim but has felt
that that action would only serve to antagonize the other claimant nations.
The U.S. feels strongly that it has as legitimate a claim as any other nation. See
Klotz, 14-48
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to assert their claims. 163 The chances of such a scenario developing
becomes much more likely if minerals are discovered in minable
quantities, their extraction becomes economically feasible, and if the
Wellington Convention is not adopted.
The treaty is, however, fairly responsive and flexible, an attribute
that will surely contribute to its survivability in the near future. For
example, in 1983, at the request of many of the acceding nations, the
rules were amended to allow acceding nations to attend all
consultative meetings and any negotiations involving minerals
negotiations. This move gave these nations more of a say in the
affairs of the continent and helped diffuse any potential
dissatisfaction with the current treaty system, thus contributing to
its longevity. 164
Although the treaty is seemingly flexible, it is nonetheless
vulnerable because it is eligible for review after 30 June 1991. If
such a move is undertaken by any Consultative member, the powers
of the current ATS could conceivably be sufficiently diluted so as to
render the document completely ineffective. Therefore, it is in the
best interest of the United States to ensure the treaty's continuance
indefinitely, which is in fact the goal. The official position as stated
163 Ibid.
164 Richard A. Woolcott, "The Interaction Between the Antarctic Treaty System
and the United Nations System," in Antarctic Treaty System; An Assessment:
Proceedings of a Workshop Held at Beardmore South Field Camp. Antarctica.
January 7-13. 1985 . by the Polar Research Board Commission on Physical
Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources National Research Council (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986), 382-383.
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by the Department of State is very clear: "It (the Antarctic Treaty) is
a strong, responsive framework for conducting activities in
Antarctica in a peaceful, cooperative, and environmentally sound
fashion." 165 But what if the current ATS does breaks down? What
other security arrangements exist in the region to assist in
maintaining the Antarctic region as a neutral entity and thus
safeguarding U.S. interests?
B. THE RIO TREATY
The South Pacific is now dotted with burgeoning island nations
which have recently gained their independence, possibly providing
the potential for new Soviet naval bases in the future. Granted, the
Soviets would have to become economically stable again before they
could begin to rebuild their sphere of influence. But whether they
completely cast off the specter of communist ideals, they in all
probability will not become a completely market society, embracing
capitalism and adopting the U.S. style of democracy.
The United States and the Soviet Union will continue to be
competitors in the world for the ever-increasingly scarce natural
resources and spheres of influence. This is precisely why the
southern sea lines of communication (SLOC's) and in particular those
around the Antarctic Peninsula and the Drake Passage, must be
protected. Any future mining operations in the Antarctic would
165
"Antarctic Treaty," U.S. Department of Slate. Bureau of Public Affairs .
October 1987.
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require the transportation of these goods to the U.S. for final
processing. If a strong mutual security treaty is not in place it may
be extremely difficult to enlist the services of the southern cone
nations in the protection of these vital sea lanes in the event of the
demise of the current ATS.
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 was
the first mutual security arrangement that the United States entered
into following WWII. The treaty created a defensive zone around the
Western Hemisphere to also include Greenland and Antarctica.
Article 3 of the treaty contains the essence of the treaty: "the high
contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against
an American state shall be considered as an attack against all of the
American states and, consequently, each one of the said contracting
parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack." 166 At first glance
this appears to be a reasonably clear commitment on the part of all
Western Hemisphere nations to come to the aid of each other in the
event of an attack by any other nation. But a closer examination of
the exact wording of this article reveals that it is in fact a vague
commitment to come to the aid of a member nation. Unfortunately,
this treaty does not specify what type of aid shall be rendered.
Additionally, before any assistance is given it must first be approved
166Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin
America (Princeton University Press, 1987), 181.
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by a two-thirds majority of the foreign ministers in the Organization
of American States (OAS). 167
There have been only three occasions where the treaty has been
invoked. In 1955 Ecuador convinced the OAS that Peru was about to
invade and a peace-observing team, consisting of military attaches
stationed in Lima, was used. 168 It was also invoked in 1962 during
the Cuban Missile Crisis and during the 1965 invasion of the
Dominican Republic, the latter two at the insistence of the United
States. The most recent attempt to invoke the provisions of the
treaty was in April 1982 at the beginning of the Falklands/Malvinas
war. In reaction to the Argentine invasion, the British immediately
imposed an all-encompassing embargo upon the Argentines and
called for others, such as the United States, to follow suit. At this
time the U.S. had in place certain laws prohibiting the sale of military
equipment to Argentina, because of alleged human rights violations,
but was reluctant to progress beyond those particular restrictions.
Based upon these instances, the Latin Americans view the treaty
as a dismal failure. The fundamental difference between the two
perspectives is found in the assumed application of the treaty.
Although designed as a mutual defense treaty, the Latin American
nations tend to see it as a means to resolve territorial disputes such
as in the Ecuadorian and Falklands/Malvinas cases. The United
167 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to
Globalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 26.
168 Child, Geopolitics, 1985, 95.
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States on the other hand, views it as a means of defending against
any Soviet, and thus communist, intrusion into the Western
Hemisphere, as evidenced by the Cuban and Dominican cases. 169
This fundamental disagreement as to the exact purpose of the treaty
has thus led the Latins to their conclusion. 170
During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the United States found
itself torn between its historic and cultural ties with Great Britain
and its perceived obligation to act in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty. In a vote taken at a meeting of the OAS, Argentina was
able to convince the Permanent Council, by a vote of 17-0, with four
abstentions (Chile, Colombia, Trinidad-Tobago and the United States),
that the Rio Treaty should be invoked. 171 The U.S. had argued,
unsuccessfully, that since Argentina was the aggressor it was
extremely difficult for it to side with Argentina. Although the U.S.
did provide the British with intelligence, logistical and some material
support, the main U.S. effort was in the area of diplomacy, with
169 Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin
America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 31.
170 Child, Geopolitics, 1988, 91-93.
171 Molineu, 31
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Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempting to negotiate a mutually
agreeable solution to the situation between the two belligerents. 172
172Under a 1962 agreement the United States is required to provide Great
Britain with fuel at Ascension Island whenever it is required. The British had
a very fragile logistics trail to the South Atlantic and were not capable of
supplying the fuel needed to conduct its operations. The United States provided
12.5 million gallons of aviation fuel alone, which was used in Nimrods,
Vulcans, and C-130's which dropped supplies ashore on the Falklands.
Wideawake Airfield on Ascension was also used as a logistics center for further
distribution to the forces in the South Atlantic. "Britain Asks U.S. for
Supplies," New York Times , 18 May 1982, A6.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Antarctic region has long been characterized as an area of
conflict because of competing claims on the Antarctic continent and
its insular areas. The motivation for such competition stems from
the potential wealth of renewable and non-renewable resources as
well as from the international prestige to be gained from fulfillment
of geopolitical goals. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 has effectively
"frozen" the various sovereignty claims for the time being. However,
after 23 June 1991 the treaty can, as stipulated in the treaty itself,
be renegotiated. This situation presents three possible outcomes.
The first and most probable outcome is for the status quo to
remain. It is likely that the Consultative nations to the treaty will
choose not to renegotiate the treaty in the near future, mainly
because any renegotiating process would undoubtedly have to
include the entire membership of the United Nations. It is apparent
from the action initiated by the Malaysian delegation to the U.N., that
the second and third world nations, not currently involved in the
Antarctic, see the potential for economic gain from the non-
renewable resources and would take some action to procure a
portion of the potential economic benefits of the region.
The second possibility would be contingent upon the discovery of
these minerals in minable quantities. If these minerals could be
mined in an economically efficient manner, then it is possible that
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the region could experience a flood of mining operations despite
whatever mining prohibitions may be in place at the time. In this
eventuality the Consultative members may be forced to renegotiate
in order to obtain an agreement that is acceptable to all parties
involved.
The third possibility would be an escalation of hostilities over the
sovereignty issues, based upon economic or geopolitical conflict
among the three nations with overlapping claims, with Argentina
being the most likely initiator. In 1982 Great Britain and Argentina
went to war over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. At the
time of the invasion, Argentina, under military rule, displayed little
hesitation toward the use of force in the accomplishment of this
geopolitical objective. Bellicosity of this nature has obvious
disruptive repercussions in the Southern Cone and threatens the
very continuance of the Antarctic Treaty regime.
There is much speculation that this sort of action would not have
taken place under a civilian government. Indeed there is strong
evidence to suggest this is true. In 1984, after the military
government of General Leopoldo Galtieri had been replaced, the new
civilian leaders were quick to ratify the Peace and Friendship Treaty
between Argentina and Chile, supposedly settling once and for all the
long disputed Beagle Channel conflict. However, there was still a
large cadre of Argentine geopoliticians who were dissatisfied with
the settlement and felt it was rushed through with unwarranted
haste, allowing for unneeded compromises. It is possible in years to
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come, a government of Argentina, prompted by a geopolitically
dissatisfied public, could turn the national attention away from, for
example, a failing domestic economy, by refocusing on geopolitical or
economic objectives in the South Atlantic or Antarctic region.
In order for the threat of military action by Argentina to become
a viable possibility, a number of circumstances would have to exist.
First, another military junta would have to come to power with
overwhelming popular support. Secondly, the economic situation
would have to maintain a profile similar to or worse than its current
pattern. Thirdly, the nation's abundant natural resources, such as oil
and natural gas would have to be considerably depleted. Since the
development of this particular resource has the greatest potential for
supplementing the Argentine economy, it also will be the prime
economic motivating factor in any future Argentine exploration for
this commodity south of 60 degrees south. The discovery of a vast
oil reserve within the disputed sector, could, in combination with the
first two conditions, provide the needed impetus to assert Argentine
sovereignty on the disputed Antarctic claim.
After analyzing the conditions that prompted the invasion of the
Falklands in 1982 and the conflict's results, it seems extremely
unlikely that the current civilian government in Argentina would
take any military action to expel Chile and Great Britain from
Antarctica. Although the current economic conditions in Argentina
are as deplorable as in 1982, the Menem government is too
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interested in achieving "first world" political status to attempt any
military solution to the sovereignty question.
The potential for conflict in the Antarctic region is currently
very low, but nonetheless a possibility given the propensity for
nationalism and weak economies in the two Southern Cone nations
and the fact that the sovereignty issues in the South Atlantic and on
the Antarctic continent remain unresolved.
With end of the Cold War, the major extrahemispheric threat to
regional security, and thus the neutrality of the Antarctic, has
essentially been removed for the time being. The U.S. Department of
Defense is being cut by 25 percent and the Soviets are concentrating
on their own domestic problems. In light of these changes the
importance of a truly, mutually workable security arrangement
between especially the U.S. and the Southern Cone countries has no
current incentive for success. This does not suggest that there should
not be one in place. Indeed, the Rio Treaty should be modified and
given the same detail as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in
order to preclude any lag in time caused by the negotiation of some
new arrangement in the event of the demise of the current Antarctic
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Treaty System and any Soviet reposturing in the future. 173 In this
eventuality, the South Atlantic and South Pacific regions, now
covered by the Rio treaty, could take on a new strategic importance.
Finally, the United States should make every effort to maintain
the current Antarctic Treaty System. Any move within the United
Nations to coopt the region under U.N. control should be vigorously
opposed. Allowing U.S. influence to be diffused through the United
Nations, would not only be disadvantageous for the United States,
and the other Consultative nations, but would be disastrous for the
Antarctic continent.
173 There are those who scoff at the possibility of a reposturing by the Soviets
and hopefully they are right. Consider what the former Foreign Minister,
Eduard Shevardnadze, once Gorbachev's closest ally, had to say. In a interview
with the Polish newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, responding to the December 1990
'no-confidence' vote, he stated: "... the situation is proof that my warnings
about a dictatorship are justified. The situation of confrontation can lead to
chaos and anarchy, and dictatorship will come. It will not be important
whether [he] comes from the right or left, and I do not know the name of the
dictator. He will be born out of chaos and anarchy." Therefore, any new
dictatorship, in combination with the quest for new spheres of influence and
the need for new sources of natural resources, could provide the impetus for
Soviet reposturing. "Jeff Trimble, Can Gorbachev Last," U.S. News and World




The governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French
Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America,
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica
shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
shall not become the scene or object of international discord;
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge
resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Ant-
arctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the contin-
uation and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of
scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International
Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and Lhe progress of
all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful
purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarc-
tica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations;
I lave agreed as follows:
1
ARTICLE I
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of
military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.
ARTICLE II
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward
that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall
continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.
ARTICLE III
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investiga-
tion in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty,
97
me v_omracung rarues agree mat, to me greatest extent feasible and
practicable:
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica
shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of
operations;
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expe-
ditions and stations;
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be
exchanged and made freely available.
2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to
the establishment of cooperative working relations with those Special-
ized Agencies of the United Nations and other international organiza-
tions having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.
ARTICLE IV
1. Nothing contained In the present Treaty shall be Interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted
rights of or existing claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis
of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which It may have
whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Ant-
arctica, or otherwise;
(c) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its
recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or
claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty In Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty
in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present
Treaty is in force.
ARTICLE V
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radio-
active waste material shall be prohibited.
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning
the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the dispo-
sal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parlies
whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meet- ings
provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established under
such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.
ARTICLE VI
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60*
South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty
98
shall prejudice or In any way affect llie rights, or Ihe exercise of the rights,
of any State under International law with regard to the high seas within
that area.
ARTICLE VII
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the
provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Tarty whose repre-
sentatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in
Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to
carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers
shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them.
The names of observers shall be communicated to every other Con-
tracting Parly having the right to designate observers, and like notice
shall be given of the termination of their appointment.
2. Each obseiver designated in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any
time to any or all areas of Antarctica.
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equip-
ment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of dis-
charging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be
open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accor-
dance with paragraph 1 of tliis Article.
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas
of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to desig-
nate observers.
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty
enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and there-
after shall give them notice in advance, of
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or
nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or pro-
ceeding from its territory;
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by
it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph
2 of Article I of the Treaty.
ARTICLE VIII
In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present
Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the
Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in
Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and
scientific personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph 1(b) of Article III
of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying such persons,
shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parly of
which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring
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while they are in Antarctica for Ihe purpose of exercising Iheir func-
tions.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and
pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of sub-paragraph 1(e)
of Article XI, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute
with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall imme-
diately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable
solution.
ARTICLE IX
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parlies named in the preamble to
the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two
months after the date of entry Into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at
suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging infor-
mation, consulting together on matters of common interest pertain-
ing to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommend-
ing to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles
and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for
in Article VII of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(0 preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty
by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representa-
tives to participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the
present Article, during such time as that Contracting Party demon-
strates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific
activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the
dispatch of a scientific expedition.
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the Treaty shall
be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties partici-
pating in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article.
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become
effective when approved by all Contracting Parties whose representa-
tives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those
measures.
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exer-
cised as from the date of entry into force of the Treaty whether or not
any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been pro-
posed, considered or approved as provided in this Article.
ARTICLE X
Each of the Contracting Parlies undertakes to exert appropriate efforts,
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consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one
engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes
of the present Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties
concerning the interpi elation or application of the present Treaty,
those Contracting Tallies shall consult among themselves with a view
to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent,
in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reacli agreement on
reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the
dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by
any of the vaiious peaceful means refened lo in paragraph 1 of this
Article.
ARTICLE XII
1. (a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by
unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parlies whose represen-
tatives are entitled lo participate in the meetings provided for
under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter
into force when the depositary government has received notice
from all such Contracting Patties that they have ratified it.
(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force
as to any other Contracting Parly when notice of ratification by it
has been received by the depositary Government. Any such
Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received
within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the
modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of
sub paragraph 1(a) of this Article shall be deemed to have with-
drawn from the present Treaty on the date of the expiration of such
period.
2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force
of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose represen-
tatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for
under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the
depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parlies
shall be held as soon as practicable to review the Treaty,
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is
approved at such a Conference by a majority of the Contracting
Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided
for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary
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Government to all Contracting Parlies Immediately after the termi-
nation of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance
with the provision of paragraph 1 of the present Article,
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force
in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this
Article within a period of two years after the date of its communica-
tion to all the Contracting Parlies, any Contracting Party may at any
time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depositary
Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty; and such
withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice
by the depositary Government.
AimCLE XIII
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
States. It shall be open for accession by any Slate which Is a member of
the United Nations, or by any other Stale which may be invited to
accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties
whose respresentalives are entitled to participate in the meetings
provided for under Article IX of the Treaty.
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by
each State in accordance with its constitutional processes.
3. mstrumenls of ratification and instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Government of the United States of America, here-
by designated as the depositary Government.
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding
Slates of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or
accession, and the dale of enlry into force of the Treaty and of any
modification or amendment thereto.
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all signatory States,
the present Treaty shall enler into force for those Slates and for States
which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty
shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its
instrument of accession.
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XIV
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish
languages, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the
United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies there-
of to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.
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Appendix B
S. 257510 1st congress2n Session
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mat 3 (legislative day, AmiL IR). 1990
Mr. Kf.RRV (for hirr.«rlf. Mr. CiORK. and Mr. Pei.I.) introduced th« following bill;





To urjte the Secretary of State to nefrotiate a ban on mineral reaourer artivitirii in
Antarrlira. and for olhrr purposes.
To urge the Secretary of State to negotiate a ban on mineral
j
resource activities in Antarctica, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Reprrsenta-
2 fives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION I. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Antarctica Protection
5 Act of 1990".
(> SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
7 For the purposes of this Act—
8 (1) the term "Antarctica" menus the area of the
9 Antarctic convergence as defined in section 303(1) of
103
1 the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act of 1084
2 ( 1 1> C.S.C. 2432):
•I (2) the term "mineral resources" means all non-
A living nut ura I nonrenewable resources:
T> (3) the term "person" means any individual, eor-
(> poration, partnership, trust, association, or any other
7 private entity existing or organized under the laws of
8 the United States, or any officer, employee, agent, de-
i> partment, or other instrumentality of the Federal Oov-
10 ernment or of any State or political subdivision thereof,
11 or of any foreign government or political subdivision
12 subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and
13 (4) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of
14 State.
1 f> SEC. S. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
M5 (a) Findings.—The Congress finds that
—
IT (1) the Antarctic continent and its associated and
18 dependent ecosystems is a distinctive environment pro-
lit riding a habitat for many unique species and offering a
20 natural laboratory from which to monitor critical as-
21 peets of stratospheric ozone depletion and global cli-
22 mate change;
23 (2) Antarctica is protected by a series of intcrna-
24 tionul agreements, including the Antarctic Treaty and
associated recommendations, the Convention on the
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L';>
I Conservation of Antarctic Seals, and the Antarctic 1
- Marine Living Resources Convention which are intend-
3 cd to conserve the renewable natural resources of Ant-
4 nrctica nnd to recognize the importance of Antarctica
5 for the conduct of scientific research;
i
(» (3) recurring and recent developments in Antarcti-
7 en. including increased siting of scientific stations, poor
8 waste disposal prncticcs, oil spills, increased tourism,
{) nnd the ovcr-exploitntion of marine living resources «
*
10 have resulted in serious questions about the adequacy
1 1 of existing agreements to protect the Antarctic envi-
12 ronment and its living marine resources;
13 (4) the parties to the Antarctic Treaty have re-
14 centlv negotiated a Convention on the Regulation of
15 Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities which the
1(5 Cnited States has signed hut not yet ratified;
17 (5) the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
18 Mineral Resource Activities is not adequate to provide
H> the necessary level of protection for the fragile envi-
20 ronment of Antarctica and could actually stimulate
21 movement toward commercial exploitation;
22 ((J) the level of scientific study, including ncces-
2M sary support facilities has increased, in part to justify
24 achieving the status of a consultative parly under the
25 Antarctic Treaty. I<» the point that some scientific pro-
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1 grams may be degrading the Antarctic environment;
2 and
3 (7) the planned I9JK) special consultivc meeting of
4 parties to the Antarctica Treaty and the imminence of
5 the thirtieth anniversary of the Antarctica Treat? pro-
(? vide opportunities for the United States to exercise
7 leadership toward protection and sound management of
8 Antarctica. *.|
J) (h) Purpose.— It is the purpose of the Act to— :>
10 (1) strengthen substantially overall environmental
1 1 protection of Antarctica;
12 (2) permanently prevent prospecting, exploration
13 and development of Antarctic mineral resources by
14 United States citizens and other persons or entities
15 subject to the jurisdiction of United States laws; and
1(5 (3) urge other nations to join the United States in
17 negotiating a new agreement to provide an ongoing
18 prohibition on all minerals activities in Antarctica and
1!) comprehensive protection for Antarctica and its associ-
20 ated and dependent ecosystems.
21 SEC. J. PROHIBITION ON ANTARCTIC V.N'ERAL RESOURCE
22 ACTIVITIES.
23 It is unlawful for any person l<» engage in, finance, di-
24 redly or indirectly, or knowingly provide assistance to any
25 Antarctic minerals resource activity.
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1 SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.
- (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of
3 State should enter into negotiations with the consultative
4 parties described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article IX of
5 the Antarctica Treaty, done at Washington on December 1,
6 1955), for the purpose of concluding an international agree-
7 ment
—
8 (1) to prohibit Antarctic mineral resource activi-
9 ties by all nations;
10 (2) to grant Antarctica special protective status as
11 an International Reserve-Land of Science dedicated to
12 wilderness protection, international cooperation and
13 scientific research;
14 (3) to conserve and protect permanently the natu-
15 ral environment of Antarctica and its associated and
16 dependent ecosystems; and
17 (4) to ensure that the results of all scientific inves-
18 ligation relating to geological processes and structures
19 he made openly available to the international scientific
20 community, as required by the Antarctica Treaty.
21 (b) It is the sense of the Congress that any treaty or
22 other international agreement submitted by the President to
23 the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification relating
24 to mineral resources or activities in Antarctica should he con-




1 SEC. «. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF UNITCD
•;i. p. .».; v.;
2 STATES ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTICA- •."-* $J \!}
' ' '"' ft i
3 All nctivities conducted or sponsored in Antarctica by
4 any agency of the United States Government or by any prt-
5 vate or governmental entity receiving financial assistance
6 from the United States Government shall comply with the
7 provisions of section 102 of the National Environmental
8 Policv Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332). $
"»
9 SEC. 7. PENALTIES. . .ji
I






section 4 shall be liable to the United States for a civil
12 penalty in an amount not to exceed $10,000 for each such
13 violation.
14 (2XA) A civil penalty for a violation of section 4 sh*!i be
15 assessed by the Secretary of State by an order made on the
IB record after opportunity (provided in accordance with this
17 subparagraph) for a hearing in accordance with section 554 i
18 of title 5, United States Code. Before issuing such an order,
19 the Secretary shall give written notice to the person to be j
20 assessed a civil penalty under such order of the Secretary's
i
21 proposal to issue such order and provide such person an op-
22 portunity to request, within 15 days of the date the notice is
23 received by such person, such a hearing on the order.
24 (B) The Secretary may cotnpromi... , modify, or remit,
25 with or without conditions, any civil penalty which may be
2(5 imposed under this subsection.
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1 (3) Any person who requested in accordance with para* y> :H!T$?




' ,, . » y.
;
3 penalty and who is aggrieved by an order assessing a civil U :•?*!>
4 penalty may file a petition for judicial review of such order
5 with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
7 person resides or transacts business.









9 penalty— ' v j
10 (A) after the order making the assessment has :'>,Vv
1
1
become a final order and if such person does not file a
12 petition for judicial review of the order in accordance
13 with paragraph (3), or ;
14 (B) after a court in an action brought under parm-
15 graph (3) has entered a final judgment in favor of the
16 Secretary,
17 the Secretary shall recover the amount assessed plus interest
18 in an action brought in any appropriate district court of the
19 United States. In such an action, the penalty shall not be
20 subject to review.
21 (b) Criminal.—Any person who knowingly or willfully
22 violates any provision of section 4 shall, in addition to or in
23 lieu of any civil penalty which may be imposed under subscc-
24 lion (n) of this section for such violation, be subject, upon
25 conviction, to a fine in accordance with section 18, United
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1 Stotcs Code, or to imprisonment for not more than 5 years,
v vi ? :Bu
2 or both.
.4 • v : *#
3 SEC. 8. CITIZENS* CIVIL ACTIONS.
4 (a) In General.—Exeept as provided in subsection (b),
5 any person may commence a civil action
—
6 (1) against any person (including (A) the United
7 States, and (B) any other governmental agency) that is
8 alleged to be in violation of this Act, or
9 (2) ngainst the Secretary to compel the Secretary




12 Any civil action under paragraph (1) shall be brought in any
13 United States district court. Any action brought under para-
14 graph (2) shall be brought in the United States District Court
15 for the District of Columbia, or the United States district
It? court for the judicial district in which the plaintiff is domi-
17 ciled. The district courts of the United States shall have ju-
18 risdiction over suits brought under this section, without
10 regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
20 parties. In any civil action under this subsection process may
21 be served on a defendant in any judicial district in which the
22 defendant resides or may be found and subpoenas for wit-
23 nesses may be served in any judicial district. 4




1 (1) under subsection (oMI) to restrain a violation
2 of this Act—
•'J (A) before the expiration of 6<) days after the
4 plaintiff has given notice of such violation (i) to
5 the Secretary a id (ii) to the person who is alleged
(5 to have commuted such violation, or
7 (B) if the Secretary has commenced and is
8 diligently prosecuting a proceeding for the issu-
l> ance of an order under section 7(aM2) to require
10 compliance with this Act or if the Attorney Oen-
1 1 ernl has commenced and is diligently prosecuting
12 a civil action in a court of the United States to
I'i require compliance with this Act, but if such pro-
14 ceeding or civil action is commenced after the
la giving of notice, any person giving such notice
1(5 may intervene as a matter of right in such pro-
17 ceeding or action; or
18 (2) under subsection (a)(2) before the expiration of
10 (50 days after the plaintiff has given notice to the Sec-
20 retary of the alleged failure of the Secretary to perform
21 an net or duty which is the basis of such action.
22 Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as
2'1 the Secretary shall prescribe by rule.
24 (c) (iKNKKAL.— Nothing in this section shall restrict any
2"> ri^'lil which any person (or class of persons) may have under
•
1 1 1
1 nnv statute or common law to seek enforcement of this Act V?M
'"*
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Map 2 THE ARGENTINE SEA CONCEPT
Reproduced from Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America
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